C. Janith is a Jadetimes news reporter and sub-editor covering science and geopolitics.
Russia and China are entering a new era in space exploration with a plan to establish a nuclear reactor on the Moon by 2035 without human intervention.
Image Source: (shiftdelete/AI generated image)
Russia’s space agency Roscosmos, in collaboration with the China National Space Administration (CNSA), is planning to build an automatic nuclear reactor on the Moon by 2035. The proposed reactor will be used to provide energy to a proposed lunar base jointly operated by the two countries.
Russia and China are planning to establish an unmanned nuclear reactor on the Moon by 2035
Russia and China plan to establish an unmanned nuclear reactor on the Moon by 2035 In 2021, Roscosmos and CNSA announced their intention to build a joint lunar base called the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), open to participation from all relevant countries and international partners. Roscosmos revealed that it is working with CNSA on the project to establish a power unit on the lunar surface.
Yury Borisov, the director of Roscosmos, stated that this challenging construction task will likely be carried out “automatically” without human presence and that the necessary technological solutions are “almost ready.” Roscosmos also plans to use nuclear-powered large rockets to transport cargo to the Moon.
Russia and China have different histories regarding lunar exploration. Russia’s first lunar mission, Luna-25, failed when it crashed into the lunar surface. In contrast, China has had a presence on the Moon since 2013. The Chang’e 3, 4, and 5 missions successfully landed on the Moon, with Chang’e 5 successfully returning lunar samples to Earth.
The size or shape of the nuclear reactor planned by Russia and China for the Moon is still unclear. A nuclear reactor or similar reliable power source will be necessary to meet the energy needs of the lunar base, as it seems unlikely that solar panels will generate and store sufficient energy.
Last year, scientists in the UK presented a compact lunar nuclear reactor design considered for NASA’s future missions. This joint initiative by Russia and China is seen as a significant step in the future of lunar exploration and international collaboration in space research.
The establishment of an unmanned nuclear reactor could be critical for the long-term exploration and utilization of the Moon. What new opportunities and challenges will arise in space exploration from this joint lunar project by Russia and China?
C. Janith is a Jadetimes news reporter and sub-editor covering science and geopolitics.
In Southeast Asia, questions of power are increasingly answered not in summit halls but along railways, port terminals, and construction corridors. The region needs infrastructure - fast, reliable, and large-scale. And two global actors, China and the West, are vying to provide it on their own terms.
Image Source: (Yoshiko Kawano)
Infrastructure as a Tool of Influence
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has become one of the largest global investment efforts in decades. From Laos to Cambodia, Chinese capital is building roads, canals, and energy hubs - offering fast credit, integrated logistics, and visible results. The China–Laos railway and the Jakarta–Bandung high-speed line in Indonesia are just the most visible examples.
The West, by contrast, is still finding its footing. Through G7-backed infrastructure partnerships, green energy funds, and digital connectivity projects, it has attempted to counterbalance Beijing’s influence. Yet, its offerings often appear more like policy gestures than practical alternatives. Delays, rigid procedures, and lack of long-term financing remain major obstacles.
As China builds railways and ports faster than the West can draft communiqués, Southeast Asia becomes the stage for a quiet, concrete-bound geopolitical showdown. Infrastructure is no longer economics - it’s power projection.
When the tracks are laid before the trust is earned, don’t call it development - call it influence on rails. China understood this long ago and has acted accordingly: precisely, assertively, with a strategic appetite that no longer bothers with subtlety.
Xi Jinping’s December visit to Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia was no goodwill tour. It was a show of force: deals on logistics, energy, digital networks, and secure transit. In Malaysia, Beijing signed memoranda to enhance cooperation on 5G deployment, artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity. In Cambodia, discussions centered around the controversial expansion of the Ream Naval Base - a facility with clear strategic weight in the Gulf of Thailand.
This wasn’t simply about trade. It was Beijing’s bid to embed itself into the decision-making circuitry of Southeast Asia - not just through economic interdependence, but through digital and defense integration. This wasn’t just another chapter in the Belt and Road saga. It was a deliberate move to tilt the regional balance - not with slogans, but with steel and fiber-optic cable.
Against this backdrop, the U.S. appears curiously sluggish. Yes, it has AUKUS and the Quad. Yes, it still speaks the language of “democratic values,” trying to repackage geopolitics in the wrapping of soft power. But what does it offer, in practice? Concepts, papers, communiqués. China, by contrast, delivers rails, cables, and ports.
Washington seems almost afraid to admit it is falling behind. China operates on the ground, in specific places, with clear beneficiaries. The $6 billion China-Laos railway - a sleek, high-speed link from Vientiane to Kunming - isn’t just a transport project. It’s a geopolitical artery, binding Laos to China’s economic bloodstream and reducing its reliance on Thai or Western trade routes.
More telling is that this pattern is repeating itself. In Indonesia, the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed rail - Southeast Asia’s first bullet train - stands as another symbol of China’s speed and scale, completed with minimal Western input. In the Philippines, Beijing is bidding for infrastructure contracts with flexible financing mechanisms the West rarely offers. These are not isolated cases but strategic steps in a regional endgame.
Infrastructure in the 21st century is not just economics - it’s influence.
Control over logistics means control over dependency. Whoever builds the roads writes the rules. That’s the logic behind Beijing’s moves. It doesn’t offer partnership - it offers infrastructural dependency under the elegant banner of “mutual benefit.”
The U.S. is lagging not only in investment but in narrative. Its vision of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” is a beautiful myth, unsupported by tangible reality. Southeast Asian markets want stability, yes - but they also want trucks, not just envoys. Where there’s no offer, there’s no trust.
This narrative gap is growing. The U.S. continues to emphasize abstract values, but in a region grappling with supply chain bottlenecks, rising energy needs, and post-pandemic recovery, values don’t pour concrete. Beijing knows this. Its investments are visible, measurable - and crucially, fast. Washington’s counteroffers are often slow-moving, mired in oversight procedures, and sometimes laced with conditionalities that local governments view as patronizing.
In the end, the choices made by regional countries don’t look ideological - they look utilitarian. What brings more jobs to Malaysia? Who ensures smooth trade flows for Cambodia? Who can Vietnam trade with safely without compromising sovereignty?
Vietnam, for instance, is navigating a careful balance - accepting Chinese investment in energy and transport while deepening security ties with the U.S. and Japan to hedge against overdependence on Beijing. This kind of hedging is increasingly common. Thailand, too, has kept a foot in both camps - welcoming Chinese capital while maintaining military cooperation with the U.S. The strategy isn’t to pick sides; it’s to maximize options.
Perhaps Pax Americana isn’t over. But more and more, it resembles a vintage suitcase - elegant, nostalgically familiar, but cumbersome and impractical.
The trade routes of the 21st century are not built around principles - they’re built around container ports and digital corridors. Those who understand this are already in the game. The rest are left to watch the train leave the station - and it’s not heading for Washington.
H. Rahman is a Jadetimes news reporter covering Business
Image Source: Kevin Lamarque/Reuters
Tesla's financial performance took a significant hit in the first quarter of 2025, with profits plummeting 71% compared to the same period last year, according to the company's earnings release on Tuesday. The results fell short of analysts' expectations, raising concerns among shareholders about the future direction of the electric vehicle (EV) giant.
Total revenue for the quarter decreased by 9% year-over-year, amounting to $19.3 billion. Notably, revenue from car sales saw a sharp decline of 20%, reflecting the challenges Tesla faces in a competitive market. The company reported a 13% drop in vehicle deliveries during the first three months of 2025, further underscoring the difficulties it is encountering.
Elon Musk, Tesla's CEO, opened the earnings call by addressing his dual role as a government employee and the company's leader. With his temporary government position set to expire next month, Musk indicated that he would soon be able to devote more time to Tesla. He defended his work with the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), claiming that it was essential for addressing financial inefficiencies, although he provided no evidence to support his assertion regarding the motivations of protesters against the company.
Musk stated, "I think starting probably next month in May, my time allocation to those will drop significantly," suggesting a shift back to focusing on Tesla's operations. He also mentioned that he would continue to work with the government on a part-time basis to ensure that progress made in curbing waste and fraud is maintained.
In addition to discussing his government role, Musk addressed the impact of President Donald Trump's tariffs on Tesla's business. He reiterated his belief that lower tariffs are beneficial but acknowledged that the ultimate decision rests with the elected officials. "I'll continue to advocate for lower tariffs … but that's all I can do," he said.
Tesla's earnings release highlighted concerns about "changing political sentiment" potentially affecting demand for its products. The company warned that the current tariff landscape could have adverse effects on its operations, stating, "Uncertainty in the automotive and energy markets continues to increase as rapidly evolving trade policy adversely impacts the global supply chain and cost structure of Tesla and our peers."
Dan Ives, a managing director of equity research at Wedbush, described the current situation as a "fork-in-the-road time" for Tesla, as the company grapples with declining stock prices and increasing competition, particularly from Chinese manufacturers like BYD. Tesla's shares have lost approximately half their value since reaching an all-time high in December, with most of the decline occurring after Musk's controversial governmental cost-cutting initiatives began.
Despite the challenges, Tesla remains a leading player in the electric vehicle market. However, the company faces mounting pressure as competitors like BYD continue to innovate, recently unveiling advancements in self-driving technology that could be integrated into models priced as low as $9,600.
As Tesla navigates these turbulent waters, the company's ability to adapt to changing market conditions and competition will be crucial in determining its future success. The upcoming months will be pivotal as Musk shifts his focus back to Tesla and the company seeks to stabilize its operations amid a challenging economic landscape.
