Chethana Janith, Jadetimes Staff
C. Janith is a Jadetimes news reporter covering science and geopolitics.
According to TASS, citing a comment made by Foreign Minister Lavrov during an interview for the RT documentary ‘Bridges to the East’ («Мосты на Восток»), Türkiye is ready to discuss the withdrawal of its troops from Syria, though the terms for such a move have not yet been agreed upon.
According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Turkey’s policy vis-à-vis Syria rests on the following principles: the preservation of Syria’s territorial integrity (although Türkiye is officially committed to Syrian territorial integrity, the de-escalation zone is pretty much a Turkish protectorate and de facto Turkish occupation of Syrian territory, however Türkiye justifies this presence to achieve goals of utmost importance in its national security), a cessation of hostilities, a peaceful process of inclusive political transition and liquidation of terrorist threats in the border region. The latter, i.e. the Kurdish issue, has long been central to Turkish foreign policy; the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has been waging an insurgency against the Turkish government since the early eighties. The People’s Defence Units (YPG), the Syrian branch of the PKK, are likewise considered by Türkiye to be a terrorist threat and multiple Turkish counterterrorist operations have been carried out in Syria specifically against the organisation: operations Olive Branch (January, 2018), Peace Spring (October, 2019), Winter Eagle (February, 2022) and Claw Sword (November, 2022). Defence Minister Yasar Guler has previously expressed that the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Syria is conditional upon the adoption of a new Syrian constitution and elections. As of right now, Türkiye sees a major terrorist threat from the Kurds not only for its citizens within Türkiye itself, but also for the millions of citizens of Idleb, which could turn into a flood of refugees were the borders to be unsafe, adding to the already existing 4 million Syrian refugees in Türkiye.
Considering the longstanding Turkish concerns vis-à-vis the Kurds, it came as no shock that Türkiye immediately backed the Opposition at the onset of the Syrian conflict and continues to do so today. A particularly sour point for the Syrian government is Türkiye’s tacit support for HTS* (*organisation banned in the Russian Federation) in Idleb, which it considers a terrorist organisation. In effect, Türkiye has turned the Idleb region into a ‘security zone’, which hosts persons that have fled from other parts of Syria – a large part of which were radical fighters – and at the same time prevents them from flocking to Türkiye. Until now, Erdogan had expressed his willingness to meet Assad for talks, yet not to cease its support of the Opposition nor accept a military withdrawal of Turkish troops from Northern Syria. Such terms were unsatisfactory to official Damascus, who kept declining such a meeting. Now, however, the situation has changed. According to numerous reports, Türkiye is open to discussions with Syria and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has stated that while his country maintains the necessity of the withdrawal of Turkish troops, it is not a precondition to talks.
Turkish military presence in Syria
Türkiye’s military presence in Syria is vast; it has tens of bases and an estimated 10,000 soldiers in northern Syria along the two countries’ border. Türkiye was quick to back the Syrian opposition in the beginning of the crisis in 2011-2012, however the first direct involvement of Turkish troops was on August 24, 2016, when Turkish troops invaded northern Syria within the scope of Operation Euphrates Shield, which mainly targeted the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant*. This marked the beginning of the Turkish occupation of northern Syria.
The next Turkish operation was Operation Olive Branch (in coordination with the Syrian National Army). Active fighting lasted just over two months. And was followed by a year-long Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF, Kurdish) insurgency. Türkiye targeted the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in and around Afrin, a Kurdish-majority area. As a result, Türkiye gained control over the entire Afrin District (as well as Afrin itself), which allowed for linking Idleb to Aazaz for the first time in about two years.
According to the 2018 Sochi Agreement, i.e. the Turkish-Russian Memorandum on Stabilisation of the Situation in the Idleb De-escalation Area, Russian military police and Syrian border guards were to facilitate the removal of YPG elements and their weapons (tanks, MLRS, artillery, mortars), create a 15-20km-deep de-militarised zone from the Turkish-Syrian border, following which joint Russian-Turkish patrols were to monitor the zone’s boundaries. Also, parties committed to ensure a sustainable ceasefire within the Idleb De-escalation zone.
The Sochi Agreement was only partially implemented, with Türkiye failing to ensure the withdrawal of heavy weaponry from Idleb, a stronghold for rebels, terrorists and other militants who fled other parts of the country, which only further complicated the situation. Then, in 2019, Türkiye launched Operation Peace Spring together with the Syrian National Army (Syrian opposition) against the Syrian Democratic Forces with the goals of expanding the ‘safe-zone’ to 30km and resettling Syrian refugees from Türkiye there – a highly controversial initiative evoking sharp criticism, which Türkiye has strongly opposed. A few months after the start of Peace Spring, a second Sochi Agreement (2019) was concluded, building upon the previous one and practically confirming Peace Spring’s objectives.
Operations Winter Eagle and Claw Sword (February, November, 2022) targeted Kurdish elements (PKK, PYD, YPG), with the latter also being carried out in northern Iraq simultaneously. An extension of Claw Sword is rumoured to take place in Northern Iraq.
As stated above, Erdogan maintained a hard line vis-à-vis the withdrawal of Turkish troops from northern Syria, refusing to even consider such an option. Now, however, this has (apparently) changed. Why?
In a recent New Eastern Outlook article, Alexander Svarants commented on the attempts to facilitate the restoration of Syrian-Turkish relations and which contradictions exist between involves actors. As he points out, Turkish-Syrian reconciliation, given the current regional situation, would boost Turkish importance in the Middle East. As he also correctly notes, the Syrian issue is central to Turkish foreign policy and is also immensely important to Turkish people, which currently accommodate almost 4 million Syrian refugees. Considering the importance of this issue and the general interest in having secure borders, it is impossible that Türkiye will withdraw its troops, forsaking its security concerns, without a good deal.
In the case that Türkiye is genuinely prepared to undertake such an important step, the north of Syria and the (long) Turkish-Syrian border must be secured. Considering that the US funds and supports the Kurds – with whom, by the way, Russia and Iran have pragmatic relations – it is unclear how this threat to Turkey should be eliminated or even contained. In the most basic sense: if it has not happened until now, it is because Türkiye could not make it happen, and nobody is as fervently interested in eliminating the Kurds as Türkiye. For now, a partial troop withdrawal or a reduction in the contingent seems like the most probable scenario, but likely nothing further. A full Turkish troop withdrawal is next to impossible at the moment or in the foreseeable future, as this would put the buffer zone area along the border in too fragile a situation.
Idleb remains the most ‘controversial’ piece of territory, being notorious for harbouring HTS* and all sorts of fighters. In the case that Turkish troops leave Idleb, its fate is clear: Russian-Syrian advances into the enclave with eventual recapturing of the territory. This would mean a (partial) collapse of Syrian opposition forces, which Türkiye has so long supplied – perhaps not the best outcome for Türkiye. Such a scenario would also further burden surrounding countries because of a new wave of Syrian refugees, which Türkiye cannot and will not accept. Then, perhaps, a deal will have to be made (e.g. with the US) to give shelter to the most important figures – it would not be the first time the US takes ‘freedom fighters’ under its wing.
Another factor that could possibly influence Turkish decision-making on the matter would be a change in US policy on Syria. Previously, Donald Trump, during his tenure as president, planned on withdrawing troops from Syria. This move was, however, blocked by the Pentagon and the situation on the ground did not realistically change. However, in the case such a development taking place, it is possible that Türkiye could agree to troop reduction alongside an agreement between Russia, official Damascus and the Kurds.
Now, for the first time, there is word (officially) that Türkiye is open to considering troop withdrawal from Syria, a condition previously flatly denied by Ankara and maintained by Damascus as a prerequisite for any bettering of bilateral relations. Considering, however, the multitude of factors, closed-door diplomacy and uncertainty of future developments in the region, it is not yet possible to make precise predictions. Perhaps the only predictions there are ground to make is that a Turkish troop withdrawal is imminent, but the questions of time, size and place remain open.
