How the G20 Can Support Africa's Energy Goals

Chethana Janith, Jadetimes Staff

C. Janith is a Jadetimes news reporter covering science and geopolitics.

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Africa is home to a growing pipeline of innovative new programs designed to tap the continent's abundant renewable energy sources and provide universal access to electricity and clean-cooking technologies. But a little help from the world's largest economies will be needed to realize these initiatives' potential.

Image Source: (In Pictures Ltd./Corbis via Getty)

The recent United Nations Climate Change Conference in Baku (COP29) and G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro were a watershed, particularly for developing countries. It was heartening to see the African Union join the discussions in Rio as the G20’s latest official member. And now South Africa has assumed the group’s rotating presidency.

Attending the Rio talks at the invitation of Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, I stressed the importance of achieving a just energy transition in my own country and across Sub-Saharan Africa. From Dar es Salaam and Pretoria to Baku and Rio, energy has been a major topic of discussion in global fora because it is absolutely central to both economic development and climate-mitigation efforts. In Sub-Saharan Africa, around 600 million people (almost half the population) lack access to electricity, and nearly a billion people (one-eighth of the global population) lack access to clean cooking.

Fortunately, several major new programs promise to help close these technology gaps. For example, the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the World Bank have launched the Mission 300 project, which aims to connect at least 300 million people to clean electricity in Africa by 2030. In January 2025, Dar es Salaam will host the Heads-of-State Energy Summit for Mission 300, bringing together government leaders, multilateral development banks, private investors, and others. African countries will present their plans to mobilize investments in grid and off-grid solutions using readily available and affordable energy sources.

According to the World Bank, reaching the project’s electrification target will require $30 billion of public-sector investment, much of which could come from its own concessional financing arm, the International Development Association. Since G20 member states are the biggest contributors to the IDA, we are asking them to support our mission with robust successive IDA replenishment cycles.

Another major program is Tanzania’s own $18 billion plan to catalyze renewable energy investments in 12 southern African countries that are interconnected by the same pool of geothermal, hydro, solar, and wind sources. The goal is to increase electricity generation from these sources by 8.4 gigawatts, which is in keeping with the COP28 (Dubai) pledge to triple the world’s renewable energy generation capacity by 2030.

More broadly, African leaders have also set a target (at last year’s Africa Climate Summit in Nairobi) to increase the continent’s renewable-energy generation to 300 GW by 2030 – up from just 56 GW in 2022. This will require an estimated $600 billion, a tenfold increase from current investment levels.

Connecting a rapidly growing and urbanizing population to clean power is obviously beneficial for the continent. But it also benefits the world, given the potential to avoid gigatons of additional carbon dioxide emissions. Indeed, Africa’s success in this respect is crucial to meeting the Paris climate agreement’s goal of limiting global warming to 1.5° Celsius above pre-industrial levels. Our continent is richly endowed with huge reserves of critical minerals and almost endless solar and wind power potential, but must overcome scarce (and expensive) capital flows to make the most of these resources.

A third important initiative is the African Women Clean Cooking Support Program, which I spearheaded at COP28 to achieve universal access to clean cooking technologies in Tanzania and across Africa. With more than 900 million Africans still dependent on wood and charcoal for cooking, toxic indoor smoke is the second leading cause of premature deaths on the continent – a problem predominantly affecting women and children.

This is totally unacceptable, which is why I went to Rio to call for the inclusion of a $12 billion facility in the AfDB’s African Development Fund replenishment, to drive universal access to clean cooking across Africa. The AfDB has pledged $2 billion for clean cooking over the next ten years, and at this year’s Summit on Clean Cooking in Africa other partners promised to mobilize an additional $2.2 billion by 2030. But as encouraging as these commitments are, they are not enough. The International Energy Agency estimates that achieving universal access to clean cooking in Africa will cost $4 billion per year through 2030. Complementary support from other global players is needed.

Such investments would yield far-reaching returns. In addition to reducing premature deaths from indoor pollution, replacing dirty fuels globally will save at least 200 million hectares of forests – 110 million in Africa alone – by 2030, as well as reducing greenhouse-gas emissions by 1.9 gigatons of CO2-equivalent. That would be the equivalent of eliminating all the emissions from airplanes and ships today.

The programs I have highlighted are part of a larger pipeline of ideas being pursued in Africa. But bringing them to fruition will require financing at scale, technology development and transfers, and capacity building. We are counting on our friends at the G20 to come together and push this energy agenda forward.

Did COP29 Neglect Women?

Chethana Janith, Jadetimes Staff

C. Janith is a Jadetimes news reporter covering science and geopolitics.

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Gender-sensitive climate finance could unlock more efficient pathways for adaptation, resilience, and decarbonization. But, while the texts produced at the latest UN Climate Change Conference reflect some awareness of this, they lack the kinds of provisions needed to ensure implementation at scale.

Image Source: (Sean Gallup/Getty)

The most recent United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29) focused on finance, but it fell short in more ways than one. The contentious negotiations – representatives from several developing countries walked out in protest – defied the odds to produce a commitment – the “Baku Climate Unity Pact” – from developed economies to deliver $300 billion in climate funding annually to their poorer counterparts by 2035. That is triple the target agreed in 2009 (and reached, for the first time, in 2022), but it is nowhere near the estimated $1.3 trillion in annual financing that developing economies will need over this period. Although the agreement represents progress, we must recognize it as merely a starting point.

But insufficient financing is only part of the problem. The reality is that as world leaders clashed in Baku amid unprecedented international tensions, the true battle being waged was for the future of climate finance – and women’s role in it. Women and children are 14 times more likely to die in climate-related disasters than men, and women comprise 80% of those displaced by extreme weather. These disparities are not incidental but are rooted in systemic inequalities. Yet the so-called New Collective Quantified Goal on climate finance includes just one reference to women and girls: in paragraph 26, it “urges parties and other relevant actors to promote the inclusion and extension of benefits to vulnerable communities and groups in climate finance efforts, including women and girls.”

Women and girls’ greater vulnerability to climate change reflects systemic inequality of access to education, economic opportunities, and decision-making power. These differences are also apparent at climate-related forums. While this year’s COP was heralded as the most gender-balanced in terms of registrations, women accounted for just 35% of delegates (up from 34% at COP28). Of the 78 world leaders who attended, a mere eight were women, and only four addressed gender-specific issues in their statements.

Climate initiatives that explicitly include women have been shown to produce better outcomes for entire communities. Moreover, women are already leading some of the most innovative and effective climate initiatives globally, in areas ranging from sustainable agriculture to renewable-energy deployment.

The conclusion should be obvious: the potential for gender-responsive climate finance to unlock more efficient pathways for decarbonization, adaptation, and resilience makes it a strategic necessity. And yet for every $100 of climate finance deployed globally, only 20 cents goes toward supporting women, and only 0.01% of climate finance addresses both climate action and women’s rights.

Even so, COP29 was not a total loss for women and girls. The enhanced Lima work program on gender was extended for another decade, though without additional funding for the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) secretariat to support implementation. In addition, the 27 gender-specific provisions in the final “Presidency text on gender and climate change” emphasized the vital role of women’s full, meaningful, and equal participation in climate action and the critical importance of incorporating gender considerations into all policymaking domains. The “gender action plan” that countries agreed to develop for adoption at COP30 provides a framework for progress.

Despite these commitments, COP29 fell short in addressing critical intersectional issues such as the links between gender equality, peacebuilding, and climate action. Similarly, calls to address gender gaps in skills – such as STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) training to access green jobs – and the care economy as part of climate action failed to make it into the final document. While the text encouraged gender-responsive climate finance and simplified access for grassroots women’s organizations and Indigenous communities, it lacked the structural push necessary to ensure implementation at scale.

To transform COP29’s promises into reality, we need clear international guidelines for gender integration, backed by allocated budgets, measurable targets, and participatory approaches to ensure effective, transparent, and accountable climate finance. High priority should be given to financing local initiatives, particularly in informal settlements, where women often lead climate-resilience efforts. Robust tracking systems – which monitor not only how much money is pledged, but also where it goes and who it benefits – are essential.

Of course, international action alone cannot close the gender gap in climate action; national policy frameworks are also vital. And here, too, women continue to be sidelined. According to the latest analysis from the UNFCCC, 82% of countries mention gender in their nationally determined contributions (NDCs), but fewer than 26% include meaningful gender considerations in their long-term strategies and investments. As countries prepare their updated NDCs – to be submitted this February and assessed at COP30 in November – they must take care to incorporate gender-specific programs and policies.

We do not know whether the international environment will be any less tense when countries gather in Brazil for COP30. But we do know that the failure to pursue meaningful climate action would carry astronomical costs, as the proliferation of deadly climate disasters results in lost lives and trillions of dollars in lost output. We also know that if the fight against climate change is to succeed, it must be as inclusive as it is transformative. That is why COP30 offers us a unique opportunity to reflect on our priorities and align gender equality with the Paris climate agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals.

The climate crisis is not gender-neutral, so our solutions cannot be. Without a consistent focus on gender-responsive climate finance, we risk perpetuating cycles of vulnerability. Thirty years after the UN’s Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action established gender equality’s place on the global agenda, we must achieve another leap forward for women’s rights, this time as a vital part of the fight against climate change.

Syrian ‘End-Game’ Will Reshape the Middle East

Chethana Janith, Jadetimes Staff

C. Janith is a Jadetimes news reporter covering science and geopolitics.

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The fall of the Assad regime in Syria may have been a geopolitical loss for Iran (and Russia), but the fact that Islamists have overthrown the regime threatens both Iran and Arab states, creating prospects for their cooperation in the near future and minimising whatever gains the ‘winners’ of this ‘end-game’ many have made.

Image Source: (Mohammed Huwais/AFP/Getty)

The ‘Winners’ and the ‘losers’

There are clear ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. But geopolitics is a very dynamic field in which gains and losses are hardly one-sided. In some ways, the fall of the Assad regime – and the inability of Iran to rescue its key ally in the region – may have been an outcome of Israel’s war on Palestine and Hezbollah, but it does not necessarily mean a permanent weakness of Iran and a permanent gain for Israel. For now, Israel is consolidating this gain by a) seizing Syrian territory, and b) bombarding the Syrian military positions to decimate its ability to launch any counter-offensive at all.

In other words, Israel’s steps show a clear direction. First, it weakened Hezbollah by engaging it in a brutal war. Second, it is now supporting the Islamist takeover of Syria. The Islamists have declared that they have no problem with Israel as their neighbour. Israel’s Netanyahu, on the other hand, has already claimed the credit for “reshaping” the Middle East.

Another clear ‘winner’ is Turkey, which had long wanted Assad to go. For years, the Turkish military had been maintaining a direct presence in Syria’s Idlib province, which also happened to be the main province under (partial) control of the so-called “rebel” Islamists. For years, Turkish forces shielded these groups from the Syrian (and Iranian and Russian) strikes and offensives. In addition, the fact that Turkey allowed these groups to conduct trade across the Turkish border provided these groups with economic support too. Now that Assad is gone, Turkey finds itself in a much better position than it was earlier to counter Kurdish groups.

But there are no ‘losers’

All of this apparently translates into crucial geopolitical gains for Israel (Washington) and Ankara, except there are no permanent ‘losers’ here. The fall of the Assad regime has brought to power a well-known Islamist group globally designated as terrorist. It is said to be only previously allied with al-Qaeda, but the way it controlled Idlib for years provides a sufficiently sound snapshot of where the group stands as an ultra-orthodox network, with serious questions remaining about whether the group was ever able to shun its ideological past.

Still, there is little denying that the ability of armed Islamists to overthrow Assad and capture power has upset not only Tehran but also Riyadh, Doha, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, and even Cairo. All of these states previously faced actual, or prospects, of popular discontent during the so-called ‘Arab Spring’. All of these states are Muslim-majority states, which makes them vulnerable to groups operating both regionally and domestically to overthrow monarchies and/or existing regimes. Can any of them face similar prospects as Syrians did? Let’s not forget that the “rebels” first emerged in Syria in the wake of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’. If the end of the Asad regime is the continuation of the same ‘movement’, there is no denying that it can reach other states too. A clear logic for these states to cooperate with each other against this Islamist threat, backed as it is by Turkey and Israel, exists.

Therefore, while Iran may have become ‘isolated’ and the fall of the Assad regime may have blocked its ability to support Hezbollah via Syria, Iran’s prospects of developing new – and deeper – relations with the Arab world have also increased manifold. Therefore, while Netanyahu might be right in claiming that he is “reshaping” the Middle East, the new shape might not be exactly to his liking. The coming together of Iran and Arab states would directly undermine Israeli ability to defeat Iran in the short and long run.

Iran and the Arab world

They are already cooperating. Iran, Saudia, Qatar, and Iraq were all quick to oppose Israeli incursions into Syrian territory. Saudi official statement called the Golan Heights “occupied” territory. This is not an isolated development triggered by Israeli actions. It is an outcome of an ongoing policy convergence between Riyadh and Tehran vis-à-vis Israel. On Nov. 11 at a summit of Islamic nations in Riyadh, the Saudi crown prince called on the international community, i.e., the US mainly, to compel Israel to “respect the sovereignty of the sisterly Islamic Republic of Iran and not to violate its lands.” At the same gathering, he described the Israeli war on Palestine as “collective genocide.”

In Egypt, the fall of the Assad regime has brought back echoes of the fall of the Mubarak regime more than a decade ago. When the present Egyptian ruler overthrew the government of Mohammad Morsi, a Turkish ally, Erdoğan said he would never talk to Sisi. Yet, he met Sisi twice in 2024. The fact that Turkey is now backing Islamists – and it has always supported the Egypt-based Muslim Brotherhood – there is yet again every reason for Egypt to align its policies in ways that might help keep the Islamists at bay. This way includes closer ties with the rest of the Arab world, plus Tehran.

Quoting senior Western diplomats, a recent report in Middle East Eye described the situation as particularly unravelling for the UAE, which has “been unnerved by the US’s manoeuvring to open backchannels of communication to HTS via Turkey”. The report also mentions the UAE’s efforts to “broker talks between the government of Bashar al-Assad and the US. The UAE wanted to strike a grand bargain to keep the Assad family in power”. The only reason why the UAE wanted Assad to stay in power was that the alternative to Assad would cause more damage to Emirati interests than any potential benefits. The Islamists are that alternative now that no one, except the Turks and the Israelis, wants.

Therefore, a logical response of these states (Arab and Iran) is to develop coordinated action to thwart any prospects of an Islamist revival, including the revival of the Islamis State, which has a sizable presence in Afghanistan. This is probably the only way that the Arab states can collectively outmanoeuvre Turkey and Israel. There is also little denying that any effort to deepen Gulf-Iran cooperation will be squarely seen as a welcome development in Moscow and Beijing, both of which have vital interests in the region.