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Chethma De Mel, Jadetimes Staff

C. J. De Mel is a Jadetimes news reporter covering Entertainment News

 
Five Astounding Rock Climbing Destinations
Image Source : Nikolaos Smalios

The world is filled with awe-inspiring rock formations, offering climbers both physical and mental challenges. Whether it's scaling towering cliffs or navigating intricate caves, the allure of climbing has surged in recent years. Movies like Mission: Impossible II, with Tom Cruise scaling Utah's red rock, and the Oscar-winning documentary Free Solo, chronicling Alex Honnold's ropeless ascent of El Capitan, have helped fuel this global interest.


Australian climber and photographer Simon Carter, who's been climbing for 40 years, has witnessed the sport’s rising popularity. "I've seen so many people getting into outdoor climbing over the last 20 years," Carter shares. He attributes this growth to adventure films, the rise of indoor climbing gyms, and the inclusion of sport climbing in the 2020 Tokyo Olympics. Carter, who explores some of the world’s most breathtaking climbing spots, has compiled his experiences in The Art of Climbing, showcasing stunning locations for both amateurs and seasoned climbers. Here are five of his top picks.


1. Tasman Peninsula Pillars, Australia


Five Astounding Rock Climbing Destinations
Image Source : Stephanie Sykora

The Tasman Peninsula in southeast Tasmania is renowned for its rugged coastline and towering sea columns of Jurassic dolerite, rising up to 300m from the sea. Known for its historical convict colony, Port Arthur, this area also boasts three iconic climbing pillars: The Totem Pole, The Moai, and Pole Dancer.

“The Totem Pole is like a giant matchstick sticking out of the ocean, offering a technically challenging ascent,” Carter says. This 65m pillar is for advanced climbers, as it requires two hours of hiking and abseiling just to reach the base. The Moai, a smaller 22m pillar, offers a moderate challenge, while the Pole Dancer requires a full-day adventure, with multiple abseils and climbs. Adventurers can reach Tasmania via direct flights to Hobart or Launceston or by ferry, and having a vehicle is essential to explore the remote coastline.


2. Kalymnos and Telendos, Greece


Five Astounding Rock Climbing Destinations
Image Source : Nikolaos Smalios

While islands like Crete and Santorini are familiar to many tourists, Kalymnos, located in the Dodecanese chain, is a climber’s paradise. "Kalymnos is one of the world’s most famous climbing destinations," says Carter. The island is covered in limestone crags and caves, offering over 4,000 climbing routes for all levels.


One of the highlights is the Crystal Cave on Telendos, a nearby island accessible by ferry from Kalymnos. Known for its endurance challenges, climbers need a 100m rope to descend after completing the climb. Kalymnos is reachable by direct flights from Athens or ferries from neighboring islands like Rhodes.


3. Smith Rock State Park, USA


Five Astounding Rock Climbing Destinations
Image Source : Marc Turcan Berty and Emily Mandagie

Smith Rock State Park in Oregon is considered the birthplace of modern American sport climbing. "It’s an awe-inspiring place," says Carter. Located in central Oregon’s high desert, the park offers over 2,000 climbing routes, including The Smith Rock Group, The Christian Brothers, and Monkey Face. With its steep, clean walls, Smith Rock became a hub for sport climbing in the 1980s, when climbers began bolting routes to challenge themselves physically.


Carter points to To Bolt or Not To Be, a 41m-high wall in the Dihedrals area, as a pinnacle of sport climbing. First climbed in 1986, it remains a coveted challenge for top climbers.


4. Les Calanques, France


Five Astounding Rock Climbing Destinations
Image Source : Marc Turcan

Stretching along France’s south coast, the Calanques National Park near Marseille is a historic climbing area. "The Calanques have long been a training ground for French mountaineers," says Carter. The area features dramatic limestone cliffs that overlook the Mediterranean, with routes suitable for both traditional and modern climbers.


The national park spans 520 sq km and includes 26 rocky inlets or "calanques," which are popular with hikers and climbers alike. Carter highlights Arête de Marseille, a classic route on La Grande Candelle formation that was first climbed in 1927, and the park’s striking overhangs and caves that offer a mix of difficulty levels.


5. Ha Long Bay, Vietnam


Five Astounding Rock Climbing Destinations
Image Source : tripsavvy.com

Ha Long Bay in northeast Vietnam, a UNESCO World Heritage Site, is not only a popular destination for junk boat cruises but also an incredible playground for climbers. With over 2,000 limestone karsts rising from the ocean, some reaching 400m high, the area offers unique climbing experiences. "Ha Long Bay is a crazily beautiful place," says Carter.


The main hub for climbers is Cát Bà Island, home to rugged cliffs and Butterfly Wall. For more adventurous climbers, deep-water soloing—where climbers scale cliffs without ropes, using the ocean as their safety net—offers a thrilling challenge. The Face and Turtle Cave are two of Carter’s favorite climbs in the area, providing stunning views and unforgettable experiences.


For climbers seeking adventure, these five destinations provide not only physical and mental tests but also the opportunity to connect deeply with some of the world's most beautiful and remote natural environments.

Chethana Janith, Jadetimes Staff

C. Janith is a Jadetimes news reporter covering science and geopolitics.

 

Despite stating otherwise, the European Union has increasingly turned towards restricting trade relations with China. This is not due simply to China’s support for Russia in the ongoing US- and NATO-backed military conflict in Ukraine but the pressure Washington has been putting on the EU to ‘regulate’ its trade ties with China in order to restrict Beijing’s rise to global economic supremacy and protect Washington’s interests.

Jadetimes, EU's Trade Clash with China
Image Source : (bruegel/Getty)

At the heart of these restrictions is also the increasing inability of Western neoliberalism to compete, successfully or even meaningfully, with the Chinese economic model, which works on the basis of a strong role of the state. Still, the EU’s trade war is likely to intensify due to the recent victories of far-right parties in Europe. If Donald Trump wins the next elections, the European far-right and the American far-right could merge to build an anti-China trade block. Harris’ victory, however, may not ensure a common stance.


The EU’s Trade War on China


European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is particularly known for her anti-China position. She was recently re-elected to lead the EU as its president until 2029. During her previous tenure, the EU saw many legal instruments developed to ‘oversee’ and ‘regulate’ trade ties with China, mostly on the same lines as in the US. One of these, for instance, is the ‘Foreign Subsidies Regulation’, which began to be applied to trade with and investment of China from July 12, 2023, onwards. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure “fair competition” by checking the undue advantage that the recipients of these subsidies (e.g., Chinese companies) bring to the European market, consequently outbidding local companies. In addition, the EU’s International Procurement Instrument – which entered into force in 2022 – gives the commission the authority to block investment by companies funded by non-EU governments and cut businesses out of procurement contracts if their home market is closed to EU bidders. This is even though China itself has already passed regulations to open its economy to foreign investors. This is in addition to how the EU is expanding its current sanctions on Russia to include Chinese companies working with or in Russia.



What Does it Mean for Economic Growth in the EU?


Reports indicate that this ‘war’ on China is unlikely to bring any concrete benefits to Europe. In fact, the restrictions have already led to a visible decline in Chinese investment in Europe, taking it to the lowest levels since 2010. If this trend continues, it will only worsen the health of the economy in Europe, which has been stagnant at best since the past decade or so. Should the EU continue to target China? It makes no sense. Consider this:


The EU’s import dependence on China is 90% or higher for certain pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and raw materials. In addition to this, most of the EU’s dependence on China for other types of materials and products, such as magnesium, permanent magnets, photovoltaic cells, and certain antibiotics and hormones, have no substitutes. Were the EU to continue to blindly the US in its footsteps, it would only shoot itself in the foot.


Will Europe Shoot Itself in the Foot?


With Ursula again in power, she is most likely to continue with the trend she herself set in the past five years. In addition to this, the recent rise of far-right parties – in France as well as in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and elsewhere in Europe – has caused no small amount of political tensions. More importantly for the health of the economy, these victories mean that the EU is taking a political turn that might not be qualitatively different from Donald Trump’s stance on trade with China.


Where this might change is the victory of Kamala Harris in the US elections in Europe. The far right in Europe is not simply radically conservative vis-à-vis immigrants; it also especially emphasises strategic autonomy from the US. Were Trump to win, far-right parties in Europe would benefit insofar as they would have a like-minded in the White House who is never keen to pay American taxpayers’ money to protect European security. The European far-right – which seems to have a more inward, nationalist disposition – might also see in Donald Trump an ally tackling China. Were Harris to win, however, while she might continue Biden’s war on China, she is unlikely to offer the European far-right an easy choice to adopt ‘strategic autonomy’ and get rid of NATO. In this case, whether European far-right parties – who would still be led by an anti-China president – will ally with Harris’ anti-China position or not will be a moot question.


To some extent, the decision might come down to China’s own approach to Europe’s new political realities. As reports indicate, Beijing is already taking appropriate steps to court these parties. In the event of Beijing succeeding in laying down mutually agreed ground rules of trade, the EU’s far-right might not adopt an openly anti-China stance. This will put Harris in a tight spot insofar as she may ultimately have to offer the EU some strategic autonomy in exchange for its support for Washington’s own ‘trade war’ on China. Still, were Trump to win, we might still see EU states developing economic ties individually with China. There is, in other words, an interesting twist to both transatlantic ties and their common or divergent outlook vis-à-vis China.

Chethana Janith, Jadetimes Staff

C. Janith is a Jadetimes news reporter covering science and geopolitics.

 

The 11th Format 2+2 meeting was held in Queenscliff, Victoria on 5 September. As a reminder, this type of event was established in 2007. The meeting was attended by the country’s foreign and defence ministers Penny Wong and Richard Marles and their Japanese counterparts Yōko Kamikawa and Minoru Kihara.

Jadetimes, Summary and Outcomes of the Japan-Australia 2+2 Meeting.
Image Source : (eastasiaforum/AP/Getty)

The 11th Format 2+2 meeting was held in Queenscliff, Victoria on 5 September. As a reminder, this type of event was established in 2007.


The meeting was attended by the country’s foreign and defence ministers Penny Wong and Richard Marles and their Japanese counterparts Yōko Kamikawa and Minoru Kihara.


The last meeting took place in December 2022, which is considered almost the most successful in the process of bilateral rapprochement. In that year, the trend towards a dramatic increase in “defence and security” became clear. In early January 2022, Prime Ministers Scott Morrison and Fumio Kishida signed the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) via video conference. This document allowed combat units of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) to remain in Australia to participate in certain exercises.


In October of the same year, F. Kishida met with Anthony Albanese in Perth, Australia. The “Joint Declaration”, adopted as a result of the talks at that time, became a fundamental document for the further development of bilateral cooperation in the field of “defence and security”.


In this context, the 11th meeting of the Japan-Australia Format 2+2, which is the subject of this article, focused on the implementation of the key provisions of the Joint Declaration.


Japan and the challenge of Australia’s frigate fleet renewal


In February 2024, Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles announced the launch of an international tender for the purchase of 11 advanced frigates worth a total of $11 billion. Companies from Germany, France, Spain, Japan and the Republic of Korea are expected to participate.


The Australian Navy currently has eight ANZAC class frigates, which were designed in the early 1990s on the basis of the MEKO 200 frigate by the German company Blohm und Voß. They were under construction until 2006. We can therefore conclude that this is a “renewal” of the ship’s composition, as well as a significant increase in the capacity of the Australian Navy.


This is fully in line with the new version of the National Defence Strategy (NDS), the main provisions of which were outlined by R. Marles in April 2024. Particular attention is drawn in this document to the significant expansion of the range of tasks and sea space in which the future Australian Navy will operate.


Commentators on the above-mentioned message of the country’s Deputy Prime Minister recall that something similar was observed ten years ago. At that time, a tender to equip the Australian Navy with new diesel-electric submarines was announced with the same foreign bidders. In 2017, the French Naval Group was declared the winner in the battle for the contract, even though the diesel-electric Sōryū submarine from Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries looked more favourable in terms of tactical and technical characteristics. It has been suggested that the failure of the latter was mainly due to the Japanese military-industrial complex’s lack of experience in competitive arms trading on international markets. It is argued that the failure of the latter was mainly due to the Japanese military-industrial complex’s lack of experience in competitive arms trading on international markets.


However, the French winners’ joy at winning a huge contract (estimated at between $60 billion and $90 billion) was short-lived. In September 2021, the creation of AUKUS was accompanied by the cancellation of the contract with France and its subsequent transfer to Australia’s two “big brothers”, who undertook to build nuclear-powered submarines. This was a symbol of the further strengthening of defence and security cooperation between the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia in the Indo-Pacific region.


In the same context of the growing importance of defence and security in Australia’s relations with Japan, one should also consider the priority that Canberra is now giving to the latest frigate Mogami, built by the same Japanese company, MHI, in the above-mentioned plans for the renewal of Australia’s surface fleet. Incidentally, the photos of this ship show the same “low-observable Unified Complex Radio Antenna (UNICORN)” that interested the naval command, but also India, during the Japan-India “Format 2+2” held in New Delhi two weeks earlier.


If Japan is successful in this bid, it will be the first major breakthrough of the country’s military-industrial complex into the international arms market, which will undoubtedly help to revive the interest of the national economy in this area of investment, which it seemed to be abandoning.



Outcome of the 11th Format 2+2 Meeting between Japan and Australia


At the opening ceremony, Deputy Prime Minister R. Marles reminded the guests that he was receiving them at Fort Queenscliff, which in the past had played a role in the country’s fortification system. Apparently a little carried away, he also said that “there is no country in the world with which we have closer strategic ties than Japan”. As if such a statement would not offend the two “older brothers”, who are also the companions of the “younger” in AUKUS.


However, it is worth noting the reservation of the second person in the current Australian government, who also noted the special role of the outgoing F. Kishida in building bilateral relations. In the speeches of all four participants in the forthcoming meeting, a number of recently established memes were present as sources of concern. They mentioned the “growing military cooperation between China and Russia”, the former’s “risky actions” towards the Philippines and Taiwan, as well as in the South and East China Seas in general. Meanwhile, Japan and Australia themselves were described as “two great democracies” concerned about the “undermining of rules and institutions”.


The main contents of the comprehensive Joint Statement are decisions concerning, for example, the conflicts in Ukraine and the Gaza Strip.


The basis for further development of bilateral cooperation in the sphere of “defence and security” is the above-mentioned “Joint Declaration” of 2022. The main multilateral configuration for solving problems in this sphere should be the “USA-Japan-Australia” triangle, which is also assigned the role of a centre of attraction for other countries. Of these, India, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines and the Pacific countries deserve special attention. Japan’s involvement in the development of advanced military technologies, in which AUKUS will now be involved, is also mentioned.


In summary, two points should be noted. First, the negative reaction to the fact and outcome of the regular Japan-Australia meeting in the “2+2 format” was fully expected by the main addressee, to whom the participants of this event sent unfriendly messages. Second, we should point out that the foreign policy course of Japan and Australia is in the process of formation, and the event discussed here is still one of the significant events in this “transition” process.


Much will depend on the development of the situation in the region as a whole, the nature of which can hardly be reasonably predicted today.

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