Chethana Janith, Jadetimes Staff
C. Janith is a Jadetimes news reporter covering science and geopolitics.
The meeting of the leaders of India and China, which took place on October 23 on the side-lines of the latest BRICS summit, became one of the most significant events of the Kazan summit, in which 30 countries participated.
On the beginning of détente in Chinese-Indian relations
In a commentary on the Chinese Global Times, the term ‘détente’ was used to characterise the state of relations between them, two of the multiple participants in the ‘Big Global Game’ at its current stage, which began to form both as a result of the aforementioned meeting and as a result of certain previous events. This article is a reaction to the words of Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar that it is premature to talk about the normalisation of relations between the two countries and that “restoring trust and readiness to work together will, naturally, take time”.
Half a century ago, the term ‘détente’ was used at one point of the Cold War by very responsible (both to their own peoples and to the world as a whole) leaders of opposing military and political groups. One of the main tasks was to prevent the use of ‘doomsday devices’, which are today absent-mindedly juggled by self-asserted political connoisseurs due to schizoid propaganda.
However, it did not, of course, reduce the multitude of fundamental problems at the heart of the Cold War itself, which were not eliminated by détente. Today, the ‘détente’ that has seemingly begun does not eliminate the serious issues in relations between the two Asian giants. This is likely what was meant by the head of the Indian Foreign Ministry and his commentators from the leading Chinese newspaper, warning against premature euphoria about the results of the meeting of the Chinese and Indian leaders in Kazan.
Issues in relations between India and China
This meeting was preceded by the resolution of a private problem that arose after the famous events of the summer of 2020 in Ladakh, a disputed area in the Himalayas. That which was agreed upon on the eve of the meeting between Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi boils down to the fact that the border guards based there will not face each other looking through a scope, but will rather engage in joint patrolling of certain paths passing through the territory that remains disputed.
There are several such disputed areas (with a total area of about 130,000km2). In the 50s and 60s, attempts were made to solve the territorial issue according to the principle of mutual and approximately equal concessions.
But something went wrong; what exactly went wrong is hard to pinpoint. This is the mystery of the whole issue of Chinese-Indian relations, the scale of which goes beyond the disputed territories. In order to define this ‘something’, international conferences are held with the participation of reputable Indologists and Sinologists who offer plausible hypotheses about this ‘something’.
10-15 years ago, it was defined by the word ‘Tibet’. More precisely, the state of bilateral relations after the liquidation of the virtually independent status of Tibet at the end of 1950. This status, in turn, turned out to be a consequence of the turmoil in China as a result of the Xinhai Revolution of 1911-1912. Since 1952, Tibet has ceased to be a sort of buffer zone between India and China and the military units of both countries are now separated by a 4,000,000 km line of actual control, which is not an internationally recognised border and will not become such until the parties resolve the issue of control over several of the above-mentioned disputed territories.
As a result of this and a number of subsequent events (this is first of all the 1959 rebellion in Tibet), the head of Buddhism in the world and about 100,000 Tibetan refugees found themselves in India, creating ‘authorities in exile’ there. This aids in keeping the ‘Tibetan issue’ – and suspicion in relations between India and China in general – in a tense state.
Over the past 10-15 years, radical changes have taken place in the status of these countries in the format of the ‘Big Global Game’. At the same time, the interests of both India and China extend far beyond national borders, intersecting on the territories of ‘external’ countries, which include all the countries of the Indian Ocean area and that are adjacent to India and China on the Asian mainland.
The situation developing within and outside Bangladesh requires special attention; a de facto coup took place in early September of this year and the country’s permanent (since 2009) Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, fled to India. Today, this serves as an additional reason for her to be accused of maintaining a ‘pro-Indian’ political vector, although she has actually been skilfully balancing the force fields created by two great neighbours of Bangladesh.
Relations between India and the current ‘transitional government’ of Bangladesh (which demanded the extradition of S. Hasina for her trial) have deteriorated markedly. This is especially notable against the background of a number of recent friendly gestures in Dhaka’s relations with Beijing (e.g. two Chinese navy ships visiting one of the ports of Bangladesh in the first half of October).
One may also recall India’s membership (along with the United States, Japan and Australia) in the Quad configuration, the latest summit of which was held in September in the US. Three weeks later, 10-day joint naval exercises between Quad countries took place in the Bay of Bengal. It is possible that, among other things, this was a warning signal to Bangladesh and China.
What to expect from future developments of Chinese-Indian relations?
It is difficult to make forecasts at the current stage of the radical reformatting of the world order. Therefore, assessments regarding the nature of further development of bilateral relations – both in China and in India – are reserved. The illustration in the Global Times article mentioned at the very beginning accurately reflects reality.
Nevertheless, a remark in another commentary from the same newspaper about the need to “reduce future fluctuations in Chinese-Indian relations so as to minimise geopolitical disruptions from third parties guided by hidden malicious intent” seems noteworthy. Everything is significant in this phrase, especially the term ‘fluctuations’, a word which could describe the entire period of bilateral relations between independent India and China.
The previous stage of bettering bilateral relations started during a meeting of the two countries’ leaders held in April 2018 in Wuhan, China. A year and a half later, this trend was confirmed during Xi Jinping’s return trip to India and his meeting with N. Modi. The ‘incident in Ladakh’ followed and bilateral relations again fell to one of their lowest levels.
As for the ‘third parties with malicious intent’, it is clear who is meant by this. Note that Russia is also a ‘third party’, but with the complete opposite ‘intent’. There can be little doubt that it was Russian assistance that facilitated the meeting of the Indian and Chinese leaders on the side-lines of the latest BRICS summit. Russian diplomacy should be acknowledged on this occasion.
Fully aware of the fact that various difficulties remain in Chinese-Indian relations, let us hope that this meeting will become the starting point of their long-term positive development.
