Chethana Janith, Jadetimes Staff
C. Janith is a Jadetimes news reporter covering science and geopolitics.
In a remarkable development in the Indo-Pacific political puzzle, on August 20 this year Japan and India held a 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue in New Delhi in which the foreign and defense ministers of both countries took part.
It was the third meeting of its kind, the first of which took place in New Delhi in November 2019. The original decision to create this bilateral platform was taken following a series of reciprocal visits by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Japanese counterpart at the time, Shinzo Abe.
The political background in the region
This decision was a landmark event in a long process of rapprochement in a wide range of fields between two of the three Asian powers (the third great Asian power being China) which currently, to a large extent, determine the development of the situation both on the Asian continent and in the Indo-Pacific region as a whole. It is important to note that in the political and strategic triangle formed by China, India and Japan the latter two “corners” are opposed (let us use that term, at least for the time being) to the first, albeit to different degrees.
Although, let us emphasize it once again, the foreign policies of India and Japan are still developing, and their anti-China component will not necessarily prevail even in the short term. A lot will depend on the development of the political situation within both India and Japan. Today, this factor is particularly relevant for the latter country.
Be that as it may, the anti-China factor component in the foreign policies of both countries is still (as we have already noted) manifesting itself in various ways. Particularly in the form of the New Delhi meeting discussed in this article. Once again, the very existence of the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue format is an illustration of the high level of trust between India and Japan. The fact that relations between India and Japan have continued to develop in many areas since the second meeting (three years ago) is an important testimony to this progress.
Another equally important sign of the good relations between the two countries is the fact that both are members of the Quad configuration, which also includes the US and Australia. At the end of July this year in Vientiane, the capital of Laos, on the sidelines of a regular summit of the ASEAN regional grouping, the foreign ministers of the Quad member held their most recent meeting, which resulted in the adoption of a remarkable Joint Statement. A Quad summit is scheduled to be held in India later this year. In fact, it is possible that the leaders of these four nations may meet earlier, possibly at the end of September in New York on the margins of the next meeting of the UN General Assembly.
It is worth noting that Washington sees the Quad group as an important element of the anti-China web that it has been weaving in the Indo-Pacific region in recent years. Bilateral 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue platforms have already been established between almost all of the key countries in the region. Of these, one of the most significant is that between Japan and India.
Content and main outcomes of the meetings held in New Delhi
It should be noted first of all that the three-day visit to New Delhi by the Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa and Defense Minister Minoru Kihara was not limited to 2+2 meetings with their Indian counterparts Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Rajnath Singh. There were also separate talks between the Foreign Ministers of both countries, and both Japanese guests’ visit to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
The main outcomes of the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue meeting were set out in the Joint Statement adopted at the end of the talks. Small in length, consisting of 13 paragraphs, it deserves a careful reading in its entirety. Here we will only draw attention to the fact that more than half of the contents of this document (paragraphs 4 to 11) are devoted to various aspects of bilateral cooperation in the sphere of defense and security.
Political commentators have focused particularly on the negotiations on the transfer by Japan to India of technology for the production of Unified Complex Radio Antenna (UNICORN) radars, mainly used on naval ships, an issue dealt with in paragraph 11. This is indeed a significant development, but not so much for India (which surely has the ability to acquire such technology from its other current partners), but for Japan itself. Its importance for Japan lies in the fact that it provides the Japanese military-industrial complex, “hemmed in” by a relatively small domestic market for its products, something that it has needed for a long time, access to foreign markets.
Some general thoughts on the prospects for the future development of the China-India-Japan triangle and the situation in the region as a whole
Before we begin, a few points should be noted. First, each of the “corners” of this triangle is already one of the few major participants in the current stage of the “Great World Game.” Consequently, all developments in relations between these countries inevitably have an effect (and an increasingly powerful one) on the ongoing transformation of the wider international field of play. The focus of that field of play is (moreover) shifting to the Indo-Pacific Region.
Besides, despite the increasingly threatening nature of this transformation, nothing has yet been definitively determined. The intensifying struggle between various elite groupings of countries within the “Western” world is becoming extremely important. The motives underlying this struggle are determined by differing approaches to the solving of current political problems. However, in reality, the struggle has its roots in fundamental contradictions between different answers to the fundamental questions of human existence.
And one part of the Western elites is already openly discarding the previous experience accumulated over millennia. It is hard to avoid associating the recent pre-election congress of the Government party in the world’s leading nation with a ritual gathering of witches on Bald Mountain.
Japan, which is also considered to be a “Western” country, has not yet reached such a grotesque level. However, it is also on the verge of an escalating struggle between the main political factions. With Prime Minister Fumio Kishida due to step down from the leadership of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, and from government, at the end of September, the contest between the candidates to succeed him is already unfolding. So far, Shigeru Ishiba, who is openly anti-Chinese, appears to be the favored candidate. Meanwhile, Yukio Edane, who is hoping to lead the main opposition party, the Constitutional Democratic Party, was suspected of pro-Chinese sentiments as far back as the beginning of the last decade (due to the Diaoyu Dao/Senkaku Islands standoff, which grabbed headlines at the time).
Once again, let us express our bewilderment at the tendency of the leading countries of Europe to “stretch” their sphere of interest so as to take in the main political faultlines in the Indo-Pacific region. As recently as the end of July, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni made a very successful visit to the People’s Republic of China. And there has been no sign of Italy taking part in the ongoing international air force exercises in India, although several other European countries are among the participants.
But, of course, Italy cannot afford to turn a blind eye entirely to some of the general strategies of the West. And so, only three weeks after Giorgia Meloni’s visit to China, the flagship of the Italian Navy, the aircraft carrier Cavour, arrived in the region in order to take part in joint exercises with Japanese ships. And days earlier, two German Navy ships docked in the port of Tokyo, while their commander awaited orders from Berlin regarding a return passage through the Strait of Taiwan.
Which begs the generalized question: where are Italy and Germany, with their escalating domestic problems, and where are Yokosuka, Tokyo and the Strait of Taiwan? Or, to put it differently, what pressing need compels them to stick their noses into escalating problems on the other side of the globe?
Generally speaking, the same questions apply to the “Big Brother,” across the Atlantic, despite all the attempts to divert attention from them. Among other things, with the help of the above-mentioned witches’ sabbath on Bald Mountain, which looks particularly challenging in the light of the country’s problems, which are highly dangerous (just as Europe’s problems are) and are growing in size like a rolling snowball.
India’s foreign policy, as already noted, is also very much in a state of development. Both in general terms, and in its relations with the main participants in the “Great World Game.” The very existence of the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue meetings with Japan is a clear example of the increasingly visible rapprochement between New Delhi and certain “Western” countries. Nevertheless, there are also certain positive signals (though not many, as yet) in Sino-Indian relations. It has been reported, for example, that India intends to lift some restrictions on Chinese investment in the Indian electronics industry.
That is, there are still grounds to state, as noted above, that nothing is “finally” determined. Neither in the increasingly important China-India-Japan triangle, nor in the bilateral relations between its individual “corners.”
