Chethana Janith, Jadetimes Staff
C. Janith is a Jadetimes news reporter covering science and geopolitics.
The targeted Israeli bombings of Beirut, as a result of which a number of high-ranking political and military officials of Hezbollah (including Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah) and Hamas.
Why did Israel decide to escalate in Lebanon?
For several months now, Tel Aviv has been warning that it will enter into a military conflict with the militant organisation Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. For many years, Israeli diplomacy and intelligence have been actively working to split the relations of Arab countries on the Palestinian issue.
It was no accident that Benjamin Netanyahu divided Arab states into partners and opponents of Israel. As you know, he attributed Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt, Qatar, Morocco and Sudan to the first group, i.e. the richest, resource-rich states that maintain favourable economic relations with the West and are set up for business partnership with Israel (some of them signed the Abraham Accords in 2020-2021). The second group includes Lebanon, Yemen, Syria and Iraq, which are backed by Shi’a Iran and support the anti-Israeli resistance.
The long-winded Arab-Israeli conflict in Gaza has in many ways become the result of Iran’s active military-political support of Shi’a proxies in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. Israel views Iran as its main adversary. Considering the absence of direct border with Iran and Tehran’s strategy of guaranteeing sufficient military might (including their nuclear programme), Tel Aviv has for many years actively worked towards creating supporting military facilities near the Iranian border on the territory of neighbouring Iraqi Kurdistan and Azerbaijan.
The government of Netanyahu is not at all interested in the restoration of economic and trade ties between Iran and Western states. In 2018, during the presidency of Donald Trump, Israel blocked the 2015 JCPOA (also known as ‘5+1’ between Iran and the P5, i.e. USA, Russia, UK, PRC, France), which was related to the easing of anti-Iranian sanctions. At that time, US President D. Trump not only left the aforementioned agreement, but also announced additional sanctions against Iran.
Iran’s massive aerial campaign against Israel in April 2024 in response to the diversions of the Israeli intelligence services and army vis-à-vis a number of high-ranking IRGC officers in Syria and Iraq, showed Tel Aviv the continuity of the 13th government of IRI, headed by E. Raisi. Following the death of E. Raisi in an aeroplane crash in May 2024, the new reformist president, M. Pezeshkian, objectively created a break in deciding the course of Iranian foreign policy.
On the day of the inauguration of Masoud Pezeshkian on July 30 in Tehran, head of the political wing of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, was killed, which became a massive challenge for Iran and illustrated the serious problems within the Iranian system of security. Iranian Supreme Leader Rahbar Ayatollah Ali Khamenei publicly promised to punish the organisers of the terrorist attack. At the same time, Iran – and with good reason – blamed Israel for I. Haniyeh’s death. Though Tehran was in no rush to undertake a reaction, concentrating on its thorough planning and betting on the unexpected choice of place, time, objects and forms.
At the same time, following M. Pezeshkian stepping into his role as president, he made a number of addresses to the international community about the possible changes in Iranian foreign policy, the main idea of which was the idea of Tehran’s readiness to engage in direct negotiations with the US and Europe on the rejection of nuclear weapons and a softening of anti-Iranian sanctions so as to restore trade and economic relations.
Pezeshkian, having participated in the 79th UN General Assembly in New York, made yet another statement confirming the aim of his government to engage in negotiations with the West, supported the sovereignty of Ukraine and did not exclude the reduction of tensions with Israel if Tel Aviv would be ready to do the same. Such words evoked criticism in conservative circles within the Iranian political elite.
It is difficult to say whether this was prepared beforehand by Pezeshkian to probe Washington and Brussels vis-à-vis the restoration of the negotiation process with Iran, or whether he received the support of the administration of US President Joe Biden. But it is a fact that, at the moment of the end of the UNGA, the Israeli Defence Forces carried out targeted air strikes on objects of Hezbollah leadership in Beirut and liquidated Hassan Nasrallah, who headed the organisation for 30 years, and others.
Evidently, Benjamin Netanyahu planned a similar strike to pull Iran into the active phase of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, achieve the engagement of the US on the side of Israel and eliminate the possibility of returning to the negotiations between Iran and the West on softening sanctions and developing trade and economic relations with IRI, i.e. not allowing Iranian gas to enter the European market.
In parallel to that, Israeli leader B. Netanyahu demonstrated the intelligence, military and technological might of the Jewish state and the weakness of the Iranian forces and their proxies opposing them. Evidently, for these reasons, Israel decided on escalating the conflict in Lebanon.
A political schism in Iran – what next?
According to Al Meyadeen, in response to the death of the head of Hezbollah following strikes by the Israeli Air Force, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated on his presidential site that the promises of the US and European countries about “reaching a ceasefire agreement if Iran will not respond to the assassination of the head of the political wing of the Palestinian Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, in Tehran turned out to be fake…The crimes of Israel will not remain unpunished. Having killed Hassan Nasrallah, Israel once again demonstrated that it does not follow any international norms”.
The Iranian president called on Arab and Islamic countries not to stand aside idly and to join the front of resistance on the side of Palestine against Israel. In Iran itself, dissatisfaction with the statements of Pezeshkian arose, who unreasonably believed the US and publicly betrayed the memory of Ismail Haniyeh, turning the inevitable retaliation into political bargaining. Calls for jihad against the Zionist regime, which has committed a series of crimes, are increasing in the Iranian media.
Whether Iran will strike, if not at Israel, in anticipation of US military assistance, then the border territories with Israeli Air Force bases will also be problematic.
After the death of H. Nasrallah, Luke Coffey, a senior researcher at the Hudson Institute, noted that Azerbaijan needs to be prepared for this against the background of the aggravation of the situation in the Middle East.
However, in this case, Turkey will be forced to intervene on the side of its military ally, which will lead to a big split in the Islamic world.
In Azerbaijani publications (for example minval.az) there are joking publications addressed to Iran (they mock what will become of Tehran’s ‘red lines’ after demonstrating their weakness in Lebanon and Yemen).
Netanyahu is maybe only waiting for such an Iranian decision, which will lead to the involvement of a number of countries in the Arab-Israeli conflict with unknown consequences for Iran.
Only he knows what Tehran will do. However, Iran does not have much choice. Perhaps political changes are expected in Iran in the sense of the institution of the president and the declaration of the new course. It cannot be ruled out that Tehran will launch targeted strikes against individual Israeli facilities and its high-ranking officials. In the case of Azerbaijan, Iran is able to do exactly the opposite, creating problems for the United States, Turkey and NATO.
