Chethana Janith, Jadetimes Staff
C. Janith is a Jadetimes news reporter covering science and geopolitics.
Lately in Iraq it is increasingly clear that many Iraqis want to rid their multi-confessional society of its secular past from the era of Saddam Hussein and to turn the state into a Shi’a theocracy. This is evidenced by several facts and decisions taken by the government.
USA’s negative influence
When former US President George W. Bush Jr sent troops to Iraq in 2003, he cited many far-fetched reasons to justify the invasion, including building a freer, more open and democratic Iraq. He even promised that the US-led invasion that overthrew the Ba’ath regime of former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein would become “an example to all the Middle East” and a watershed event in the global democratic revolution. However, all these good wishes of the former US president evoke only an ironic smile, bitterness and sorrow for the many dead and wounded Iraqis. The words of Bush Jr. were quickly forgotten and now no one remembers them.
Over the years, the idea of rebuilding Iraq as a democratic state has become so questionable that much of the time it is simply ironic, as the country continues to slide into the rule of a Shi’a oligarchy, kleptocracy and now theocracy. The main idiotic mistake of the US occupation authorities after 2003 was the hasty drafting of a new constitution (although no one asked them to do so), which was strongly influenced by Shi’a groups and Kurdish nationalist parties promoting their own narrow programmes. When the new constitution was approved in a referendum largely boycotted by Sunni Arab Iraqis, they argued that it was a test of whether secularism and democracy could be reconciled with political Islam and whether Iraq’s new rulers would be able to navigate between conflicting values and cultures. It soon became clear that such statements were exaggerated and ridiculous and they were quickly refuted by numerous shortcomings and problems in the application of the new – or rather the US – constitution, which was forcibly imposed on the Iraqi people by their American occupiers.
Almost 20 years later, it turns out that the constitution, which was supposed to be a new ‘social contract’ between Iraqis and the state, has many structural and political flaws and does not at all take into account the Iraqi reality. Today, the country that has been bankrupted by the USA has to cope with instability in its fragile political system, as well as sectarian and ethnic divisions, which have turned Iraq into a home for Shi’as, Sunnis, Kurds and other minorities – it is their home, but in no way is it a state. Instead of stimulating the ‘consensual democracy’ professed by the US drafters of the constitution, the institutions of post-invasion Iraq created a sectarian and ethnically-oriented quota system, which led to the dominance of the country’s main Shi’a political groups in the government, parliament, judiciary and security agencies.
Examples of the Islamisation of Iraq
One manifestation of such a constitutional failure has been the growing Islamisation of the public sphere in Iraq, the latest example of which is the introduction of a bill in the country’s parliament to amend the 45-year-old family status law, which many considered to be one of the most favourable for women in the Muslim world. The bill, which would allow Muslim clergy to hold weddings outside of government institutions, if passed, would infringe on women’s rights and increase the number of underage marriages in a society that remains deeply patriarchal. This would effectively abolish the minimum age of marriage for Muslim girls, previously set at 18 by a 1959 law. It would also allow religious authorities to make decisions on a number of family matters, including inheritance, divorce and custody of children.
Women’s rights activists and certain independent members of parliament have protested against the new law, accusing its Islamist drafters of attempting to harm women, children and families, weaken social cohesion and undermine the authority of the state. Foreign critics, including the UN and many human rights organisations, have criticised the new law as undermining the rights of women and children. They have called on Iraqi authorities to continue compliance with the international treaties to which Iraq is a party and their obligations under international law. According to the United Nations Agency for Children, UNICEF, 28% of girls in Iraq are married before the age of 18, sometimes at the age of 15 with court permission. There is a high divorce rate among those who marry minors.
It is unclear whether the current attempt to change the 1959 law will succeed, as several previous attempts have resulted in failure. In the past, the Iraqi parliament was unable to meet to commence the second reading of the bill due to a lack of quorum. One of the key elements missing from the debate is the point of view of influential clerics in Hawza in the city of Najaf, the centre of Shi’a theology, which cannot reject legislation consistent with religious beliefs and traditionally distances itself from the state. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani and other senior representatives of the Shi’a religious establishment, who would take on a huge responsibility if the law were passed, have kept silent about the proposed changes.
In the past years Iraq has witnessed a growing wave of Islamisation on all levels
This has become the concern of the dominant Shi’a ruling class, the majority of which are Islamists and close to the Islamic regime in Iran. The annual Arba’een ceremony, which is the culmination of the 40-day mourning period in memory of the death of Imam Hussein in the Battle of Karbala in 680 AD, attracts millions of pilgrims to the holy city of Karbala in Iraq. The event was a demonstration of the religious identity of Iraqi Shi’as, as well as a demonstration of the power of their political groups in the government.
In May, in response to a proposal by the leader of the National Shi’a movement Muqtada al-Sadr, the Iraqi parliament declared Eid al-Ghadeer, dedicated to a controversial event in the history of Islam, an official national holiday in the country. According to the Shi’a calendar, the event is timed to coincide with the last sermon of the Prophet Muhammad, in which he appointed his cousin and Shi’a saint Imam Ali as his successor and head of the Muslim community.
Shi’a and Sunni scholars disagree on the Eid al-Adha holiday and its religious significance in Islam. Before the expansion of Shi’a powers in Iraq, this issue was largely absent from Iraqi public discourse for fear of inflaming sectarian divisions.
During another recent event, the Iraqi Ministry of Education banned mixed classes for preschool students across the country. The ministry said in a statement that all boys and girls in Iraqi secondary schools will now be separated. Ministry spokesman Karim al-Sayed said the decision was made ostensibly to improve the quality of education, create a suitable learning environment and prevent students from being distracted.
Responsibility of Kurdish and Sunni politicians
Both Iraqi Kurdish and Sunni politicians bear much of the responsibility for the country’s drastic Islamisation and they have contributed greatly to the democratic impasse because of their silence, insisting instead on uneasy power-sharing agreements between the country’s oligarchs. The Kurdish parties, whose leaders hold liberal views, have not made any public statements about the new personal status law or the broader campaign to Islamise the country. By resorting to their strategy of making deals with their Shi’a counterparts, the Kurdish parties appear to have used their rejection of Islamisation as a bargaining chip when discussing their long-standing demands for oil and gas production and disputed territories.
The leaders of Iraqi Kurdistan often declare that democracy in Iraq is under threat, but accuse their Shi’a partners of abandoning public consensus only when it could reduce their autonomy from Baghdad. Indeed, like many other events that are not directly related to Iraqi Kurdistan, the rise of political Islam and the growing theocracy in Baghdad, as a rule, are not a problem for the leadership of Iraqi Kurdistan. These leaders have always proceeded from the principle of two systems in one country in the hope that this would widen the gap with the federal authorities in Baghdad and pave the way for the independence of the Kurdish region from the rest of Iraq.
Meanwhile, the country’s Sunni Arab political groups operated according to a narrow and self-serving agenda and showed little interest in resisting attempts by the ruling Shi’a Islamists to change cultural and political life on a national scale. As has become apparent from the debate on the personal status bill, Sunni politicians are seeking to strike an amnesty deal for Sunni prisoners in Iraq in exchange for their support of the new law.
It should be acknowledged that Iraq has been in a phase of regression from democracy for almost two decades, to which it was the United States that dealt the greatest blow, greater even than the rule of Saddam Hussein. The departure from power of the Sunni Iraqis and the arrival of the Shi’a Iraqis and their Shi’a Islamist groups further aggravated the country’s distancing from any remnants of democracy. Now, Iraq – and this has to be noted with regret – is steadily sliding towards a theocracy under the control of Islamist parties and Shi’a Iraqis groups.
