Chethana Janith, Jadetimes Staff
C. Janith is a Jadetimes news reporter covering science and geopolitics.
Vladimir Putin stayed in Mongolia for two days. What was the purpose of the visit?
Purpose and lessons of the visit to Ulaanbaatar
Mongolia became the first country to sign and ratify the Rome Statute (and it did so back in 2002, which makes it one of the first such states) and be visited by the head of the Russian state since the issuance of an arrest warrant by the International Criminal Court, on very dubious grounds and under no less dubious pretext. This circumstance alone speaks to the successful outcome of the event. But the purpose and lessons of the visit to Ulaanbaatar extend far beyond this circumstance. In this regard, it seems appropriate to identify two very important facts that became clear to the world with an irrefutable evidence base in the evening when the first flight departed from the runway of the Buyant-Ukhaa International Airport in Ulaanbaatar.
No international actors are able to effectively isolate Russia on the global arena.
Russia’s relations with Mongolia are not subject to revision by extra-regional forces and actors.
We invite the reader to familiarise himself with a detailed analysis of each of these two loud, but by no means unfounded (which is confirmed by the results of the visit) statements.
No international actors can effectively isolate Russia on the global arena
On the eve of Vladimir Putin’s visit to Mongolia, the international community was agitated by both fears and absurd fantasies about whether Mongolia would take any action against the Russian leader in accordance with the decisions of the ICC.
Immediately following the plans of the Russian President to visit Mongolia were announced, the Mongolian Foreign Ministry was reminded of existing obligations (from the ICC itself and a number of Western NGOs), as well as rude calls to action (from the EU and Ukraine). By the way, Ukraine itself, as is known, ratified the Statute, for which it became mad on August 21 of this year – and only with the condition of an exclusive postponement. This begs the question: was such a decision taken specifically in preparation for the mass abandonment of appeals by Mongolian colleagues?
The question can be posed even more broadly, taking into account Mongolia’s existing (and proven over decades) commitment to compliance with its international obligations. Indeed, in general, there are simply no such obligations to the ICC regarding arrest, no matter how loudly the self-proclaimed hegemons and their henchmen shout about them. The fact is that the Rome Statute itself provides for the refusal of the signatory state to execute its decisions in cases where they cause significant harm to bilateral or global international relations. The irreparable harm to more than a century of good neighbourly and partnership relations seems to more than fit this description.
However, we return to the first fact postulated by the author in this article. This visit was a significant step towards the final destruction of the diplomatic barriers built around Russia by Western countries. After all, now each of Russia’s partners, who in the foreseeable future will face pressure from the ICC and the EU on the issue at hand, will have a ‘living’ example of how the country did not succumb to Western provocations – and did not lose anything from it. Recall that following the visit to Mongolia, apart from the angry protests of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and the statements of the ICC that the actions of the Mongolian authorities would be reviewed and studied, no other sanctions were introduced that would have any significant or tangible effect for its political and economic well-being. Even the European Union, with its intolerant attitude towards Russia, did not criticise the Mongolian leadership for its decision (the only correct option), limiting itself to a helpless and in some ways even pathetic expression of ‘regret’. In turn, the US State Department announced on the evening of September 3 that it understands “the difficult situation of Mongolia and will continue to support it”. Obviously, none of the Western countries will harm their interests in Mongolia for the sake of some kind of ‘punitive and pedagogical’ step.
Russian-Mongolian relations are not up for revision from extraregional powers and actors
At the same time, this visit became a vivid example of how the long-standing and deep ties between the two neighbours turned out to be stronger than any destructive forces and intentions from the outside. Indeed, 2024 will be remembered for a number of events that determine the growth of mutual interest between Mongolia and a number of countries of the collective West – let us remember the meetings of the president of this country with the leaders of France, Switzerland, Germany, Slovenia, with the US Secretary of State and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, as well as negotiations with the Japanese Prime Minister postponed due to the threat of a new major earthquake. Nevertheless, none of these events (and many of them were aimed at this) not only did not lead to a decrease in the intensity of Russian-Mongolian contacts, but also could not prevent the Russian President from traveling to Ulaanbaatar for the first time in five years.
Impressive results of the visit
In this regard, it is not only the fact of the visit itself that is noteworthy; after all, the programme of negotiations and their results are also very impressive. In particular, the leaders announced the completion of work on a temporary trade agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Mongolia and reported on their mutual readiness and interest in resolving issues related to Mongolia’s construction of hydroelectric power plants on the rivers that make up the Baikal catchment area. Mutual assurances have been resumed regarding the promotion of the transit gas pipeline project, for which the development of project documentation has already been completed. Also, the parties signed an agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Mongolia on the development of a basic project for the reconstruction of the thermal power plant number 3 in Ulaanbaatar in Mongolia, which opens a new page in the already rich history of partnership between Russia and Mongolia in the energy field. It was also revealed that the main technical parameters of the small nuclear power plant project for Mongolia, which is scheduled to be built in the area of New Kharkhorum, were approved. New Kharkhorum is the currently projected capital of the country, to which all government authorities are planning to move from overpopulated Ulaanbaatar.
Against the background of the currently unfolding geopolitical ‘games’, the words of the President of Mongolia, U. Khurelsukh, about the confidence that Russia will become a leader in peace and security issues rang especially clearly.
Could all the above-mentioned events have happened (and even on the same day) if Mongolia was determined to develop relations with the West, even at the expense of partnership with Russia? Obviously not, and the key role is played by the country’s interest in intensive and, most importantly, constructive cooperation with all international actors, aimed at obtaining mutual benefits and not directed against other states and especially against other partners. Unfortunately, this reality of Mongolian foreign policy has remained a mystery to all the distinguished guests from Western countries who have visited this country over the past few years. However, perhaps they began to sense something on the third of September?
Epilogue
Thus, Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to Ulaanbaatar turned out to be rich not only in factual content, but also in a number of deeper meanings surrounding it, the correct interpretation of which could be very useful to the entire international community – and especially to the countries of the ‘Collective West’.
