Chethana Janith, Jadetimes Staff
C. Janith is a Jadetimes news reporter covering science and geopolitics.
The fall of the Assad regime in Syria may have been a geopolitical loss for Iran (and Russia), but the fact that Islamists have overthrown the regime threatens both Iran and Arab states, creating prospects for their cooperation in the near future and minimising whatever gains the ‘winners’ of this ‘end-game’ many have made.
The ‘Winners’ and the ‘losers’
There are clear ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. But geopolitics is a very dynamic field in which gains and losses are hardly one-sided. In some ways, the fall of the Assad regime – and the inability of Iran to rescue its key ally in the region – may have been an outcome of Israel’s war on Palestine and Hezbollah, but it does not necessarily mean a permanent weakness of Iran and a permanent gain for Israel. For now, Israel is consolidating this gain by a) seizing Syrian territory, and b) bombarding the Syrian military positions to decimate its ability to launch any counter-offensive at all.
In other words, Israel’s steps show a clear direction. First, it weakened Hezbollah by engaging it in a brutal war. Second, it is now supporting the Islamist takeover of Syria. The Islamists have declared that they have no problem with Israel as their neighbour. Israel’s Netanyahu, on the other hand, has already claimed the credit for “reshaping” the Middle East.
Another clear ‘winner’ is Turkey, which had long wanted Assad to go. For years, the Turkish military had been maintaining a direct presence in Syria’s Idlib province, which also happened to be the main province under (partial) control of the so-called “rebel” Islamists. For years, Turkish forces shielded these groups from the Syrian (and Iranian and Russian) strikes and offensives. In addition, the fact that Turkey allowed these groups to conduct trade across the Turkish border provided these groups with economic support too. Now that Assad is gone, Turkey finds itself in a much better position than it was earlier to counter Kurdish groups.
But there are no ‘losers’
All of this apparently translates into crucial geopolitical gains for Israel (Washington) and Ankara, except there are no permanent ‘losers’ here. The fall of the Assad regime has brought to power a well-known Islamist group globally designated as terrorist. It is said to be only previously allied with al-Qaeda, but the way it controlled Idlib for years provides a sufficiently sound snapshot of where the group stands as an ultra-orthodox network, with serious questions remaining about whether the group was ever able to shun its ideological past.
Still, there is little denying that the ability of armed Islamists to overthrow Assad and capture power has upset not only Tehran but also Riyadh, Doha, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, and even Cairo. All of these states previously faced actual, or prospects, of popular discontent during the so-called ‘Arab Spring’. All of these states are Muslim-majority states, which makes them vulnerable to groups operating both regionally and domestically to overthrow monarchies and/or existing regimes. Can any of them face similar prospects as Syrians did? Let’s not forget that the “rebels” first emerged in Syria in the wake of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’. If the end of the Asad regime is the continuation of the same ‘movement’, there is no denying that it can reach other states too. A clear logic for these states to cooperate with each other against this Islamist threat, backed as it is by Turkey and Israel, exists.
Therefore, while Iran may have become ‘isolated’ and the fall of the Assad regime may have blocked its ability to support Hezbollah via Syria, Iran’s prospects of developing new – and deeper – relations with the Arab world have also increased manifold. Therefore, while Netanyahu might be right in claiming that he is “reshaping” the Middle East, the new shape might not be exactly to his liking. The coming together of Iran and Arab states would directly undermine Israeli ability to defeat Iran in the short and long run.
Iran and the Arab world
They are already cooperating. Iran, Saudia, Qatar, and Iraq were all quick to oppose Israeli incursions into Syrian territory. Saudi official statement called the Golan Heights “occupied” territory. This is not an isolated development triggered by Israeli actions. It is an outcome of an ongoing policy convergence between Riyadh and Tehran vis-à-vis Israel. On Nov. 11 at a summit of Islamic nations in Riyadh, the Saudi crown prince called on the international community, i.e., the US mainly, to compel Israel to “respect the sovereignty of the sisterly Islamic Republic of Iran and not to violate its lands.” At the same gathering, he described the Israeli war on Palestine as “collective genocide.”
In Egypt, the fall of the Assad regime has brought back echoes of the fall of the Mubarak regime more than a decade ago. When the present Egyptian ruler overthrew the government of Mohammad Morsi, a Turkish ally, Erdoğan said he would never talk to Sisi. Yet, he met Sisi twice in 2024. The fact that Turkey is now backing Islamists – and it has always supported the Egypt-based Muslim Brotherhood – there is yet again every reason for Egypt to align its policies in ways that might help keep the Islamists at bay. This way includes closer ties with the rest of the Arab world, plus Tehran.
Quoting senior Western diplomats, a recent report in Middle East Eye described the situation as particularly unravelling for the UAE, which has “been unnerved by the US’s manoeuvring to open backchannels of communication to HTS via Turkey”. The report also mentions the UAE’s efforts to “broker talks between the government of Bashar al-Assad and the US. The UAE wanted to strike a grand bargain to keep the Assad family in power”. The only reason why the UAE wanted Assad to stay in power was that the alternative to Assad would cause more damage to Emirati interests than any potential benefits. The Islamists are that alternative now that no one, except the Turks and the Israelis, wants.
Therefore, a logical response of these states (Arab and Iran) is to develop coordinated action to thwart any prospects of an Islamist revival, including the revival of the Islamis State, which has a sizable presence in Afghanistan. This is probably the only way that the Arab states can collectively outmanoeuvre Turkey and Israel. There is also little denying that any effort to deepen Gulf-Iran cooperation will be squarely seen as a welcome development in Moscow and Beijing, both of which have vital interests in the region.
