Chethana Janith, Jadetimes Staff
C. Janith is a Jadetimes news reporter covering science and geopolitics.
Donald Trump and Kamala Harris are intensifying efforts to reach beyond their party's traditional supporters in the final weeks of this razor-thin campaign.
White voters without a college degree, the cornerstone of the modern GOP coalition, have declined by just over 2 percentage points as a share of eligible voters since 2020, dropping below 40% of the voting pool for the first time, according to a new analysis of Census Bureau data by demographer William Frey.
Meanwhile, both White voters with at least a four-year college degree and voters of color have each increased by about one percentage point since 2020. This continues long-term trends, with well-educated Whites now representing more than 1-in-4 eligible voters and people of color surpassing 1-in-3.
These trends help explain why the former president has devoted so much effort to reaching beyond his traditional base of White voters without a college education to attract more Black and Latino voters, especially men. And, in turn, the trends help explain the emphasis the vice president is placing on attracting more college-educated White voters who have previously leaned toward the GOP — a priority she underscored by barnstorming across populous white-collar suburbs outside Philadelphia, Detroit and Milwaukee with GOP former Rep. Liz Cheney on Monday.
The impact of these incremental shifts in the composition of the major voter groups can easily be outweighed by changes in the preferences of those groups. Trump, for instance, is counting on gains among Latino voters, especially men, to neutralize the anticipated benefits for Democrats as Latinos increase their share of the vote, particularly in closely contested Arizona and Nevada.
But the cumulative impact of these shifts in the electorate’s basic composition is undeniable. Trump, for instance, in each of his two presidential campaigns won nearly as big a share of White voters without a college education as Ronald Reagan did in 1984, according to exit polls. Yet because those working-class Whites had fallen from about two-thirds of voters in 1984 to around two-fifths now, Trump only won about 47% of the total vote in each of his two campaigns, while Reagan captured nearly 59%.
Even this year, in a race so close, small shifts in the electorate’s composition across the most competitive states could make a difference. For instance, the fact that non-college Whites, according to Frey’s analysis, have fallen as a share of the eligible electorate since 2020 considerably more in Michigan and Wisconsin than in Pennsylvania may help explain why most analysts consider the Keystone State more difficult than the other two for Harris.
Shifts in racial and educational levels are not the only important changes Frey, a senior fellow at the nonpartisan Brookings Metro think tank, has tracked in the make-up of eligible voters between 2020 and 2024. He also found that women will comprise nearly 52% of all eligible voters, which should help Harris. But his analysis shows that number actually represents a very small shift in the eligible electorate since 2020 toward men, which at the margin might benefit Trump. Frey also finds that Generation Z will make a big jump in their share of eligible voters, from about 1-in-10 last time to more than 1-in-6 this year. That increase underscores the stakes in Harris’ attempt to max out her support among younger women and Trump’s determined attempts to court young men.
Frey’s analysis finds that the White voters without a college degree are declining as a share of eligible voters not only in the nation overall but specifically across almost all of the seven battleground states. (North Carolina is the sole swing state where he found that they had increased as a portion of eligible voters since 2020.)
That decline is rooted in an ongoing process of generational replacement. Compared to younger generations, America’s older cohorts are much more heavily White and also much less likely to hold at least a four-year college degree. As those older Whites age out of the electorate, and more diverse and better-educated generations grow into it, the composition of the eligible voter pool inexorably transforms.
“Whites are a shrinking part of the population and a part of that population which is shrinking even more are the people who don’t have college education,” said Frey.
While these blue-collar Whites are receding in both the Rustbelt and Sunbelt electorates, different kinds of voters are replacing them across the two regions, Frey found.
These blue-collar Whites represent a much larger share of the total electorate in the Rustbelt than the Sunbelt: Frey found that in 2020 they comprised around half of eligible voters in both Michigan and Pennsylvania and nearly three-fifths in Wisconsin.
But Frey found that since 2020, they have declined more rapidly than almost anywhere else in Michigan (falling by nearly 3 percentage points) and Wisconsin (dropping by more than 3 percentage points). In Michigan, he found a slight increase in minority voters among the eligible voter pool, while in Wisconsin those non-White voters, who were already a smaller share of eligibles than in the other Rustbelt battlegrounds, actually declined even further.
In both states, the big gainers since 2020 are Whites with at least a four-year college degree: Frey found they increased more than 2 percentage points as a share of eligible voters in Michigan and over 4 points in Wisconsin.
In Pennsylvania, the shift isn’t as dramatic: Frey found that the non-college White share of eligible voters dropped since 2020 by about 1.5 percentage points, about half as much as in the other two former “blue wall” states. A small increase in the minority population made up most of that difference, with college-educated Whites increasing only very slightly.
Across the Sunbelt battlegrounds, blue-collar Whites are a smaller share of the eligible voters: about 1-in-3 in Arizona, Georgia and Nevada and just over 2-in-5 in North Carolina. Arizona and Georgia saw big increases since 2020 in the minority share of their eligible voter population, Frey found, while non-Whites actually declined somewhat in North Carolina and remained almost unchanged in Nevada. College-educated Whites increased as a portion of eligible voters in Nevada and Arizona, while falling slightly in Georgia and essentially holding steady in North Carolina.
After these shifts, the minority share of the eligible voting population will remain much higher in the Sunbelt than Rustbelt states, with voters of color representing about one-third of the eligible voter population in North Carolina, a little more than two-fifths in Arizona and more than 45% in both Nevada and Georgia.
In both the Rustbelt and Sunbelt, the winning modern demographic formula for Democrats since the 1990s has been to maximize their support among non-White voters and grow their support among college-educated Whites, while holding down their losses among the blue-collar Whites, with a particular focus on women in each group. In the Trump era, the dominant GOP demographic strategy has been to maximize their support among working-class voters without a college degree, particularly men. That strategy has broadened from a nearly exclusive focus on White working-class voters in Trump’s 2016 race to his more panoramic attempt this year to attract non-college-educated Black and Latino voters as well, especially men.
Manuel Pastor, director of the Equity Research Institute at the University of Southern California, says the contrasting strategies of Harris and Trump in the campaign’s final days illuminate “the task of reinvention that each party faces” as a result of the electorate’s ongoing racial and educational reconfiguration.
Trump, Pastor notes, has responded to the relentless increase in the electorate’s diversity by stressing “really a more male-leaning, masculine approach that is helping to make inroads with Latino males and, to a lesser extent, Black males.” (Trump is devoting a comparable effort to courting younger White men, especially those without college degrees, appearing on podcasts and other media sources where they congregate.)
And while Harris is expending enormous defensive effort on holding as many Latino and especially Black men as possible, she’s also accepting the shifting composition of the party’s coalition more explicitly than President Joe Biden did in 2020 and throughout his presidency, Pastor believes.
Biden, he notes, embodied an almost nostalgic desire to hold onto the Democrats’ mid-20th century base of White working-class voters, but Harris, the daughter of two academics herself, has leaned more comfortably into the party’s modern identity as a coalition primarily of often economically struggling minorities and more comfortable college-educated suburbanites.
Democrats have made progress with college-educated White voters who are offended by Trump’s rhetoric on immigration, his association with far-right groups, and his divisive language, according to Pastor. Harris is trying to ensure these issues stay at the forefront in the final days.
Patrick Ruffini, a Republican pollster, explained that Democrats' gains with well-educated Whites and Trump’s progress with blue-collar non-White voters are linked. As the electorate divides more by education, the non-White working class is increasingly drawn to Trump. Ruffini noted that Trump’s appeal to these voters is less about strategy and more about natural shifts in the electorate.
Democrats need to remain competitive among working-class White voters, especially in Rustbelt battlegrounds. Historically, Democrats have won more of these voters in this region compared to the South, where conservative evangelical Christians dominate. Against Trump, Democrats’ goal is to minimize losses among these voters.
Harris needs strong support from non-White and college-educated White voters, especially women. These groups are growing in the electorate, while Trump’s strongest supporters are shrinking, potentially giving Harris a slight advantage. Women are likely to cast more ballots than men, which could also boost Harris.
However, analysts caution that demographic trends can be offset if Trump reduces Democrats' margins with groups Harris is likely to win or expands his lead with his core supporters. For example, while Harris has a large advantage with Gen Z women, Trump could reduce its impact if he performs well among Gen Z men, as current polls suggest.
Melissa Deckman, CEO of the Public Religion Research Institute, noted that Trump’s messaging on cultural and racial issues alienates most Gen Z women, who favor inclusive democracy. However, Gen Z men, concerned about their economic prospects, may be less affected by these issues and could be drawn to Trump’s persona.
The shifting dynamics among the youngest voters highlight a broader point: demographic changes don’t guarantee outcomes but shape the challenges both sides face in building a winning coalition.
One crucial factor is voter turnout. College-educated White voters consistently turn out at higher rates than other groups. In 2020, nearly 90% of eligible White adults with a college degree voted, compared to about two-thirds of Whites without a degree and three-fifths of non-White voters, according to data from political scientist Michael McDonald.
This higher turnout means college-educated Whites form a slightly larger share of actual voters than eligible voters, while the opposite is true for non-Whites and Whites without a degree. In 2020, college-educated Whites cast just over 30% of votes, and people of color cast just under 30%. Whites without a college degree, though still the largest voting group, fell below 40% for the first time.
Women also consistently vote at higher rates than men. Since 1980, eligible women have turned out more than men in every election. In swing states, women comprised a larger share of voters than eligible voters in 2020, with women casting 53% of all ballots nationwide.
Young people generally vote less than older generations, but turnout among the younger generation has increased in the Trump era. The gender gap in turnout is even more pronounced among younger voters, which could work in Harris’s favor, as young non-White men, who are more open to Trump, have lower turnout rates.
Different data sources, such as Pew Research and Catalist, show slightly varying figures for the composition of the electorate in 2020, but they all reveal the same trend: Whites without a college degree are shrinking as a share of voters, while non-Whites and college-educated Whites are growing.
Though no one can predict exactly how many voters from each group will turn out this year, history suggests that these demographic changes will closely mirror the shifts in the electorate’s composition. Most experts believe Whites without a college degree will continue to decline as a share of voters, while non-Whites and college-educated Whites will increase slightly.
These slow-moving demographic changes tend to have their biggest impact over decades rather than in a single election. However, in this tightly contested race, even small shifts could be decisive in determining the outcome between two political coalitions with starkly different visions for America’s future.
