Chethana Janith, Jadetimes Staff
C. Janith is a Jadetimes news reporter covering science and geopolitics.
It also seems that various international, domestic, and regional variables in the economic and political dimensions will prevent widespread military-security tension in Turkey-Israel relations.
Turkey recognized Israel in March 1949. Less serious ups and downs sometimes accompanied the bilateral relations between the two sides in the following decades. These relations continued during the rule of the Justice and Development Party over Turkey.
The killing of 8 Turkish citizens by Israel in 2010, the reduction of tensions in 2016, the expulsion of ambassadors in 2018, and the existence of many ups and downs were important incidents in Turkey-Israel relations.
While Erdoğan and Netanyahu met in New York in September 2023, seeking to normalize relations fully; the Israel-Gaza War on October 7, 2023, made Ankara to intensify its criticism and recall its ambassador from Israel.
Although some Turkish diplomats continued to operate in Tel Aviv, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced in November 2024 that Turkey had severed all ties with Israel and currently had no relations with Israel. However, it appears that the Turkish embassy in Israel is operating and the Israeli diplomatic mission in Ankara is also open.
Сhallenges
Israeli-Turkish relations have reached a critical point, and the scope of tensions and disagreements has also expanded. Turkey has been one of the major critics of Israel in recent years, and the recent November 2024 announcement indicates an escalation of diplomatic tensions.
Turkey’s approach to the Israel-Palestine crisis has been based on Turkey’s foreign strategy, increasing the status of Palestine in its foreign policy.
Turkey, by opposing Israeli settlement in the West Bank, and using the international mechanism, emphasizing the two-state solution, etc., tries to play a leading role in diplomatic efforts on Palestine.
But from Israel’s point of view, many of Turkey’s approaches include interfering in social and political issues inside Israel, are considered as weakening the Israeli government, reviving Muslim institutions, and inciting violence against Israel.
Ankara has sought to cement its role in advancing Palestinian aspirations by engaging with various groups, including Hamas, offering to host Hamas political offices, mourning the assassination of Haniyeh, and occasionally “visiting” Hamas leaders from Turkey.
In May, Erdoğan called Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu a “vampire” and called on Muslims to fight the Jewish state.
In this view, Israel is a threat to “all of humanity” and has been mistreating Gaza for years. Therefore, it must be pressured by holding Israel accountable for its “genocide” and actions in Gaza, the Islamic League of Nations, and the international community.
Earlier this year, Turkey filed a request to join the genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in support of Palestine. On November 1, Turkey initiated an arms embargo, calling for a halt to arms sales to Israel.
In addition, it seems that Turkey wants to facilitate access to its national interests and even a mediatory role in reaching peace with Israel by exerting appropriate influence between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas.
Also, apart from Turkey’s explicit opposition to Israel’s war in Lebanon and the risk of expelling Palestinians, the disagreements in Syria could be an important current and future stage in Israeli-Turkish relations.
Israel and Turkey are the main beneficiaries of Assad’s collapse in Syria, but Turkey is known to support Islamist and Salafi-jihadi factions.
Although Benjamin Netanyahu called Assad’s fall on December 8 a “historic day,” Ankara does not accept Israel’s seizure of buffer zones, advance into Syrian territory, and bombing of Syrian military sites after the collapse.
Turkey and Israel have pursued their red lines in Syria with highly contradictory plans. Turkey does not accept Kurdish parties and the PKK taking advantage of the new situation in Syria or Israel occupying Damascus and reaching northern Syria.
Also, while many in Israel have declared the Kurds to be Israel’s “allies” and have emphasized the importance of protecting minorities in Syria, Turkey now sees the Kurdish threat as more prominent. In addition, Ankara is likely to have regional and international convergences in mind to pressure Israel by highlighting Israel’s role in Syria.
In the geopolitical sphere, alliances and coalitions in the Eastern Mediterranean are also not in Turkey’s interest. Ankara does not want to witness the risk of anti-Turkish geopolitical-geoeconomic coalitions forming in the region with Israel’s presence.
Dimensions of geopolitical and security cooperation between Greece, Israel, and Cyprus pose major challenges for Ankara,.
Ankara is pursuing a two-state solution in Cyprus but knows that in the Cyprus tension and dispute between Turkey and Greece, Israel stands in the Athens and Cyprus front.
Turkey has also had tumultuous relations with the European Union and the United States in recent years. Israel is an important partner and collaborator of Western military and political institutions.
Ankara still seems reluctant to have broader ties with NATO.
Turkey is also trying to reduce the possibility of Israeli cooperation (against Ankara’s interests) with the Greek-American community, Turkish opposition parties, Gulen, Armenians.
Turkey and Israel announced trade barriers against each other in 2024 and relations deteriorated. Turkey announced a trade embargo against Israel in May 2024, imposing restrictions on the export of 54 products.
However, despite trade through third countries, the trade situation has hurt the state of the economies of both sides, bilateral trade agreements, and their plans for joint initiatives for gas extraction and transportation.
The Turk opposition continues to challenge Erdoğan for his continued supply of Azerbaijani oil to Israel via Turkey and the Turkish Kurcik radar base, and for his double standards.
However, anti-American and anti-Israel sentiments have increased in Turkey. The Turkish government continues to face public backlash over the continued flow of Azerbaijani oil to Israel via Turkey, Turkey’s ongoing trade relations with Tel Aviv, and indirect trade through third countries.
Even amid public outcry in Turkey, Zorlu Holding announced its intention to sell its stake in Israel’s Dorad Energy. In this context, Ankara cannot immediately increase economic ties with Israel.
Opportunities for relations
Ties with Israel will help Erdoğan use the Israeli influence in the United States to improve relations between Washington and Ankara.
Maintaining the relationship could benefit from some intelligence, security, and military agreements or military-technological and defense cooperation, cooperation in the field of information exchange and regional security, Turkey’s military modernization, cooperation on illegal immigration, and human trafficking.
Israel and Turkey both have common interests in areas such as the South Caucasus.
However, easing tensions with Israel could help Athens compromise and reduce pressure on Ankara over the Greek islands, and militarize the Aegean Sea.
Turkey’s transportation policy could reach the Middle East, North Africa, and the Mediterranean region by taking advantage of port connections in Turkey and strengthening projects such as the sea bridge from Iskenderun to the port of Haifa.
Some key issues, especially geoeconomics in the Eastern Mediterranean and energy policy, and common interests in the field of energy could prevent a complete break. Israeli gas to Europe could help reduce Turkey’s dependence.
Turkey is also still the conduit for 40 percent of Israel’s energy, which comes from Azerbaijan via Turkey.
Israel was Turkey’s 13th largest export partner in 2023, and the total value of trade between Israel and Turkey reached $6.8 billion.
Expanding economic relations and using the economy as a factor in strengthening relations can add to other dimensions of cooperation between the two actors.
Outlook:
Although tensions between Turkey and Israel have not escalated to a security or military level, Turkey has repeatedly warned that a war between Turkey and Israel could break out.
However, many challenges remain. The level of pessimism about Ankara’s intentions in Israel is very high. Turkey cannot show a broad retreat on Turkey’s red lines in Palestine.
The range of mutual pessimism and the role of different variables may hurt the outlook for the Turkey and Israel relationship. Therefore, in the short term, it is inconceivable that the defense and security relations between Turkey and Israel will return to the level of relations of the 1990s.
With Trump coming to power in the US, the long-term strategic tension between Israel and Turkey will become more difficult for Ankara’s interests.
It also seems that various international, domestic, and regional variables in the economic and political dimensions will prevent widespread military-security tension in Turkey-Israel relations. It is also possible that actors such as Baku could help reduce tensions.
In this situation, it seems that Ankara, with a more pragmatic approach and a complex interaction of ideology, pragmatism, and geopolitical strategy of economic relations between the two countries, does not want to witness widespread, practical, or even military tension with Israel.
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