By Chethana Janith, Jadetimes News
Turkish leader Recep Erdogan is condemning Israel for the military conflict in the Gaza Strip, perhaps more than all other leaders of the Islamic states combined. However, Ankara is not moving from words to real deeds. What is the reason for this political approach of Turkey?
Will the Middle East become the detonator for a full-scale conflict?
The current Arab-Israeli conflict differs in many ways from previous similar wars. The following is interesting to note:
– The duration of the conflict, which has already lasted 9 months;
– The ferocity and destructive nature of the actions of the Israel Defence Forces;
– The large number of victims (more than 40,000 dead and over 90,000 injured);
– Pro-Iranian proxy forces being involved in the conflict on the part of Hamas, the Collective West led by the US on the part of Israel;
– Finally, the aggravation of the issue of the recognition of an independent Palestinian state on the international agenda.
Earlier Israel was limited to only the desire of achieving a blitzkrieg, but now Tel Aviv is practically boycotting the cessation of hostilities, torpedoing the negotiation process for a political settlement, clinging to maximalist ideas of the total destruction of Hamas and rejecting plans to recognise the independence of Palestine. The Netanyahu government is trying in every possible way to escalate the conflict and initiates provocations against Iran, which it sees as the main military and political adversary, in order to draw the US into the war and inflict an irreparable blow to the foundations of Iranian statehood. Now Netanyahu’s only hope is for Donald Trump, who is opposed to Iran, to win the presidential election.
The Muslim world is far from military-political consolidation
Although the rich Arab monarchies condemn Israel’s actions in the Gaza Strip, they are not ready to join Iran and its proxy forces in attacking Tel Aviv. Iran’s April missile and drone attack on Israeli military positions has clearly revealed the disunity of the Muslim world. It’s not only the oil and gas-rich Arab countries (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan, Algeria, Libya), but other states of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) are also not in a hurry to resort to military assistance to the Palestinians and declare an economic embargo on the Israelis (for example, Egypt, Azerbaijan and the Turkic countries of Central Asia).
In this context, the political regime of Shi’a Iran differs, consistently condemning the ruling circles of Israel, calling them the Zionist regime for its policy towards Palestine, providing real military assistance to Hamas in the Gaza Strip, in addition to diplomatic support and maintaining the Axis of Resistance (so far involving proxy forces in Lebanon, Yemen, Syria and Iraq). The IRGC has become the headquarters for supporting anti-Israeli forces, which creates additional military problems for Israel (especially in the north from Lebanese Hezbollah and in the Red Sea from the Houthis).
On the one hand, the assassination of the head of the Hamas’ political wing, Ismail Haniyeh, in Tehran, who had arrived for the inauguration of President Masoud Pezeshkian, revealed serious problems in the system of ensuring Iran’s internal and external security, and on the other hand dealt a significant blow to Iranian sovereignty, which proved unable to guarantee the safety of such a distinguished guest. The Iranian authorities, represented by Supreme Leader Rahbar Ali Khamenei, publicly announced retaliatory actions against the organisers of this crime, i.e. Israel – Iran has no other opinions in this situation.
For more than a week now, a lot of foreign media and experts have been predicting different variations of the Iranian response. At the same time, almost everyone agrees that it is not beneficial for Iran and the US to initiate a large-scale war in the Middle East.
Some believe that Iran does not have sufficient military and technical means to stop the offensive of the US army (and Iran is technologically inferior to Israel). Others believe that since Iran does not have a direct border with Israel, the entry of ground forces into the conflict is excluded. Still others are inclined to believe that Tehran, in order to preserve its prestige, will nevertheless inflict a local blow on Israel. But opinions differ again as to what such a blow will be because there are realistically several options here.
The ‘best response’ could be a similar sabotage and terrorist operation limited in scope, i.e. the special forces of Iran liquidating one of the members of the Netanyahu government.
Another option for an Iranian response is a simultaneous local military (missile and drone) operation of the Iranian Armed Forces with the participation of all pro-Iranian proxy forces, which will allow a sensitive blow to the Israeli air defence and missile defence system and cause considerable destruction of vital facilities (including energy systems, oil pipelines, military facilities, communications, etc.).
A third possible option is a hard blow from Lebanese Hezbollah with the active military and technical support of Iran, as Israel eliminated not only Ismail Haniyeh, but also one of the military commanders of Hezbollah, Fuad Shukr. That is why several voices in Lebanon are calling on Iran and citing its obligations to provide military support to Hezbollah.
Can Tehran withholding from a retaliatory strike against Tel Aviv serve as the foundation for renewing US-Iranian negotiations?
In reality, there may be other plans for an Iranian response. However, Israel and its main ally, the US, are considering all possible and unexpected options and are taking the necessary defence, technical, diplomatic and intelligence measures. Washington takes into account the change of political leadership in Iran and President Masoud Pezeshkian’s foreign policy goals on returning to the nuclear folder, aiming at resuming negotiations with the West and easing sanctions.
Currently, nothing can be ruled out, especially the cooperation between M Pezeshkian and M. Zarif aiming at negotiations with the US and Europe. However, nobody can guarantee Israel the total exclusion of an Iranian attack, as Iran can delay the strike, first assessing the progress of negotiations with the West. In addition, although technologically lagging behind the Israeli military-industrial complex, there is no certainty about the absence of nuclear weapons in Iran. The stakes are high.
The blitz visit of S. Shoigu to Tehran
In this regard, the visit of the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Sergei Shoigu, to Tehran and Baku caused concern in the West. The US remembers the promise of Russian President Vladimir Putin that Moscow can act similarly to Washington on the supply of conventional weapons to US adversaries in sensitive regions, as NATO members do against Russia in Ukraine.
It is obvious that Moscow discussed with its Iranian and Azeri partners not just the topic of the North-South transport corridor, but put this route in the context of the current Middle East crisis. Iran has requested military and technical assistance from Russia, perhaps air defence systems (S-300 and S-400), combat aircraft (Su-35) and missiles. But how can they be transported, only by sea? It is no coincidence that after Tehran, Shoigu met with President Aliyev in Baku. The subsequent timing of the Iran-Israel crisis will also show how significant Azeri-Russian relations in the South Caucasus region will be.
Why is Turkey making threats but not following through with military action?
Recep Erdoğan continues to publicly criticise Israel, supports recognising the independence of Palestine and continues to take new diplomatic actions. Among the latest harsh anti-Israeli actions by Ankara was Turkey’s joining South Africa’s lawsuit to the International Court of Justice accusing Israel of committing genocide in the Gaza Strip.
However, Erdoğan’s threats of a ‘night invasion’ remained at the level of impulsive rhetoric, which was not followed by any military action. Turkish expert Taha Akyol notes the great successes of his country’s defence industry and that such state-owned military enterprises as ASELSAN, Roketsan and ASFAT are included in the list of ‘100 leading companies’ of Defence News. He also mentions the contribution of the former and current presidents of Turkey (Turgut Ozal and Recep Erdoğan), as well as Deputy Minister of Defence (1985-1993) Vahit Erdem, who laid the foundations for the modern defence industry of Turkey.
Turkey, however, with all its achievements in the military-industrial complex (largely thanks to the technologies of Western NATO countries), is still not going to enter into a direct war with Israel, which is followed by world capital and leading Western with the US at the helm. In addition, on the territory of Turkey itself (especially in its eastern part) there are US and NATO military bases, which will inevitably support Israel and destroy Turkey itself. T. Akyol notes that Turkey must stay away from this confrontation.
In the Iranian-Israeli crisis, perhaps Ankara is opting for Beijing’s position: a lion watching two others fight. Turkey soberly assesses its forces in this conflict and they are many times inferior to the US-Israeli coalition. Consequently, Erdoğan can continue to verbally express his hostility towards Israel and its ruling elite, but will not cross the ‘red lines’ beyond which an irreparable response is imminent.
