Chethana Janith, Jadetimes Staff
C. Janith is a Jadetimes news reporter covering science and geopolitics.
Despite the air of partnership in relations with Russia, Türkiye expects to deepen its geo-political and geo-economic presence in parts of the post-Soviet space. Such a development could make relations go sour.
Turkish ambitions in the post-Soviet space
The collapse of the USSR became the largest geopolitical event at the turn of the 20th century. The parades of sovereignty and the formation of new, independent states created a situation of multi-vector orientations of the former Soviet republics’ new political elites.
In turn, in their geopolitical projections, the NATO countries (primarily the US, UK and Türkiye) retained aspirations for dominance in the post-Soviet regions of Eurasia, followed by the displacement of Russia’s historical presence. It was precisely this dynamic that became the basis for NATO’s advance to the East, which led to problems in relations with Russia in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.
Meanwhile, since the reign of President Turgut Ozal, Ankara has consistently pursued a course of comprehensive integration with the newly formed Turkic CIS countries and has demonstrated sustained interest in such regions as the Black Sea (with its epicentre in Crimea), the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
Türkiye wants to revive its imperial status with an updated strategy of entering the independent ‘Turkic world’ within the framework of the doctrine of neo-Futurism, as well as establishing control over non-Turkic CIS subjects (including Georgia and Armenia) in accordance with the doctrine of neo-Ottomanism and the formation of a common Turanian market. Regarding Crimea, Ankara relies on the Crimean Tatar factor and does not exclude that the Russian-Ukrainian military-political crisis will eventually allow for the establishment of a Turkish protectorate over the peninsula. In Moldova, Türkiye supports Gagauz separatism.
From the experience of the two world wars of the 20th century, Türkiye has learned an important lesson: the implementation of the doctrine of pan-Turanism is impossible if betting on a direct military conflict with Russia. In the new century, Ankara is pursuing a tactic of combining ‘small conflicts’ and ‘active partnership’ with Russia, provided that Moscow’s geopolitical contradictions with the West (primarily with the US and UK) worsen.
Similarly, Türkiye has made significant progress in strengthening ties with the new Russia and has received many dividends from economic and political cooperation in the field of energy (gas, oil, nuclear power plants), mass tourism, the Russian construction market, entry into northern Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as the formation of a common Turkic transport, energy and institutional infrastructure.
Today, the South Caucasus Transport Corridor (SCTC) and the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) have become the main bases of Türkiye’s geo-economic and geo-political advancement into the post-Soviet spaces of Transcaucasia and Central Asia. While Russia remains in conflict with the West in connection with the events in Ukraine, Türkiye is rapidly moving forward in its the implementation of the Turan project under the guise of OTS.
Ankara’s goals are not just to achieve integration with related Turkic-speaking peoples and countries, but also include very pragmatic approaches to accessing the richest strategic natural resources of independent Turkic CIS countries and ensuring their transit through its own territory to financially profitable Europe.
In military and political terms, Ankara is counting on the formation of a common system of ‘Turkic security’ and a ‘Turan Army’, where Türkiye, as a member of NATO, will become a switchboard between Turkic countries and the alliance. Finally, the implementation of Turan will objectively create a ‘dividing corridor’ between Russia, on the one hand, and the Global South (China, Iran and India) on the other. All these initial goals are combined with the interests of the Anglo-Saxons (first of all the UK).
The OTS proclaimed the slogan ‘One nation, six Turkic states’ (although the number of countries may change if Ankara manages to promote Northern Cyprus as a member of the organisation). At each forum of the heads of the OTS Türkiye dictates a new agenda for expanding common Turkic integration (including a common alphabet, a common language, a common anthem, a single bank, a common army, renaming Central Asia to Turkestan, creating a Trans-Caspian transport and energy corridor etc.).
The instability of a multipolar world
In its confrontation with the collective West, Russia advocates for the formation of a multipolar world, where Türkiye is claiming leadership in the Turkic world. However, a multipolar world will turn out to be as fragile and unstable as a unipolar world under the hegemony of the United States. The main reason for this will be related to the growing contradictions in the interests of the leaders of the multipolar world, particularly between the Turkic and Russian worlds, as the geography of aspirations will converge in the same regions (South Caucasus, Central Asia, Crimea).
By developing active economic partnership with Türkiye, Russia has provided the Turks with a significant strengthening of their economic independence. It is true that this cooperation did not save Türkiye from a serious financial and economic crisis, but it did not worsen it either.
Türkiye is trying to remain the main mediator in the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian crisis. On the one hand, Ankara calls for an early cessation of hostilities and a peaceful settlement with the option of freezing the conflict along the front line; on the other hand, the Turks have declared their commitment to the territorial integrity of Ukraine within its 2014 borders and provide considerable military and technical assistance to the Kiev regime. Accordingly, Ankara’s tactics in this matter are not limited to a ceasefire, but rather encompass the continuation of this massacre between brotherly Slavic peoples, which is leading to a weakening of the positions of the two countries.
Russia is the main generator and integrator of Eurasian economic and military-political unions (EAEU and CSTO). By developing the OTS project and planning the formation of a common Turanian market, Türkiye is creating substantive competition for Russia in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. In addition, Türkiye provides the Turkic Union with an ideological basis in pan-Turkism and pan-Turanism.
Nevertheless, within the scope of the Ukrainian conflict, Russia is quite convincingly demonstrating its consistency in achieving its declared goals (including through the use of force). The latter should be a warning to the rest of the overt and covert opponents of Russia.
In the South Caucasus, Russia maintains strategic partnership and allied ties with Türkiye’s closest friend, Azerbaijan. Baku got an energy transit route through Georgia and Türkiye to Europe, bypassing Russia, and has, at this stage, militarily returned Karabakh under its control with Moscow’s non-interference. The geography of Azerbaijan is key to the advancement of Türkiye and NATO into the post-Soviet East. Russia is counting on the foresight of the Azeri authorities to avoid provoking new conflicts in the region.
Türkiye’s moving into the post-Soviet East, which is contrary to Russian interests, could create a conflict situation in both the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Thus, Russia’s use of the Oreshnik ballistic missile without a nuclear warhead for the first time on November 21, targeting a military facility on the territory of Ukraine, was a warning to NATO countries about the inadmissibility of allowing the Armed Forces of Ukraine to use Western missiles deep in Russian territory. This forced the President of Kazakhstan, K. Tokayev, to consider strengthening the security system (although no one in Moscow is going to attack friendly Kazakhstan). However, Russia would not have used this type of weapon in Ukraine had NATO not provoked the situation. Moreover, Moscow would not have been involved in the conflict with Ukraine if the Kiev authorities had maintained friendly relations with Russia. As they say, time goes on and things change…
In these circumstances, Turkish President R. Erdogan hastened to warn his NATO allies to refrain from escalating military tensions in Ukraine and to take seriously the changes to Russia’s nuclear strategy. If Erdogan also takes into account Russia’s interests vis-à-vis Turan, then can but develop a common partnership with the Turks without forgetting the past. Otherwise, our interests will clash sooner rather than later.
