Chethana Janith, Jadetimes Staff
C. Janith is a Jadetimes news reporter covering science and geopolitics.
After eight rounds of negotiations over the past five months, South Korea has agreed with the United States to increase its share in the expenses for maintaining US troops in the country from 2026 to 2030.
According to the new agreement, payments in 2026 will increase by 8.3% compared to 2025, from 1.4 trillion to 1.52 trillion Korean won ($1.13 billion). In subsequent years they will increase in proportion to the consumer price index, but not more than 5% annually.
History of the issue
The Special Measures Agreement (SMA) between the ROK and the United States defines the parties’ shares in the cost of maintaining 28,500 US troops stationed on the Korean Peninsula (USFK). According to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), Korea is obligated to provide bases for the US Armed Forces, while the US is responsible for the costs associated with the deployment of its troops in the country. However, in 1991, an exception was made, allowing Korea to cover certain expenses, such as the salaries of Korean employees working at US bases. Although the initial cost allocation was relatively modest, it began to increase significantly during the negotiations, surpassing 1 trillion won in 2019 and reaching 1.5 trillion won in just seven years.
During his first term, Donald Trump called for a significant increase in South Korean financial contributions to the maintenance of the USFK, which led to a long stalemate in negotiations. At one point, the Korean staff of the USFK was even forced to go on leave.
In 2020, former national security adviser John Bolton stated that Trump had threatened to withdraw US troops from South Korea if Seoul would not pay $5 billion (which is approximately five times more than previously) in accordance with the terms of the new agreement on military cooperation.
In April 2024, during an interview with the US magazine TIME, Trump called South Korea a “very rich” country and suggested that the US could withdraw its troops from South Korea if Seoul did not make more financial contributions to support them. In another campaign speech, Trump called on NATO member states to spend at least 3% of GDP on defence, called the current level of 2% the ‘theft of the century’.
Concluding the agreement and its essence
The allies began negotiations earlier than usual amid concerns that if Trump returned to the Oval Office, he could go for a tough deal that could cause tensions in the bilateral alliance.
On October 4, just over a month before the US presidential election, ROK Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul and US Ambassador to South Korea Philip Goldberg signed the document, which entered into force on November 29, 2025.
The parties agreed to increase the annual South Korean contribution. In the first year of the agreement, it will amount to 1.52 trillion won ($1.13 billion), which is 8.3% more than in the previous year. Afterwards, the contribution will increase annually according to the rate of inflation, but not more than 5%. This distinguishes the terms from the existing deal, which links the increase to an annual increase in Seoul’s defence budget. It is assumed that this money will be used to cover expenses such as the salaries of Korean workers, the construction of military facilities and logistical support.
In turn, on December 11, the House of Representatives of the US Congress approved the draft National Defence Authorisation Act (NDAA) for 2025, which will amount to $895 billion 200 million dollars (1% more than this year). The document provides for the preservation of at least 28,500 US troops on the Korean Peninsula. It confirms the obligations of the United States to protect the Republic of Korea with its full defence potential in accordance with the Mutual Defence Treaty. The document requires the Pentagon to prepare a plan to strengthen expanded deterrence against the Republic of Korea by March 1, 2025, as well as to prepare a separate report on the development of defence cooperation between the United States, ROK and Japan. On December 18, the NDAA was approved by the Senate by majority vote.
The South Korean Foreign Ministry positively assessed the deal, stating that the parties managed to reach the desired, mutually acceptable agreement.
Will Trump agree?
On October 11, the South Korean Ambassador to the US, Hyundong Cho, pointed to the fact that Trump might demand a revision of the new agreement – and he turned out to be right.
On October 15, during a conversation with Bloomberg editor-in-chief John Micklethwait at the Economic Club of Chicago, Donald Trump said that if he had remained in the White House, South Korea would have paid $10 billion a year for the deployment of US troops on its territory. Thus, the amount mentioned by Trump is almost 9 times higher than the current amount. A day later, during a televised town hall event hosted by Fox News, Trump indicated that “America can’t be taken advantage of any longer in trade and in the military”. “South Korea…We have 42,000 soldiers there. They don’t pay,” Trump said, having forgotten their number, but stating that at one time he “made them pay”.
In addition, Trump has also hinted at imposing higher tariffs on imported goods, raising concerns that he could link trade issues to defence spending.
In this context, on November 12, National Security Adviser to the President of the Republic of Korea, Shin Won-sik, stated that South Korea is no longer the “one-sided beneficiary” of the bilateral alliance with the United States. “As a partner with capabilities to contribute to regional and global security and prosperity, South Korea will continue to protect its core interests”. South Korea will strive to maintain a strong security position through an integrated nuclear deterrent system in close coordination with the new US administration to counter North Korean nuclear threats: “The government will establish a close cooperation framework with the next US administration to firmly safeguard freedom and peace in South Korea and we will uphold the goal of complete denuclearisation of North Korea”.
Expert assessments and prospects for the development of the situation
“The early extension of the Special Measures Agreement ensures the stability of the alliance”, stated Patrick Cronin, chair of Asia-Pacific security at the Hudson Institute in Washington. “Trump, however, does not have the ability to protect the alliance from political turmoil. If the former president wins the November elections, he will probably try to renegotiate the terms of this deal”, he added.
Frank Aum, a senior expert on Northeast Asia at the US Institute of Peace, expects that Trump may withdraw from the START agreement, as he did with previous agreements such as the Open Skies Treaty, the Paris Climate Agreement etc.
Bruce Bennett, a senior military analyst at RAND Corp., estimated that the probability of Trump seeking to renegotiate the free trade agreement if re-elected is about 50-60%. “It will depend on who he chooses as his secretary of defence, national security adviser and secretary of state, who will advise him on issues that he needs to pay attention to”.
The researcher noted that the total estimated cost of training USFK personnel, equipment, salaries and benefits, as well as the cost of daily activities in South Korea, is likely to exceed $10 billion annually, as “American troops stationed in the Republic of Korea play an important role in containing not only North Korea, but also China and Russia. If these personnel returned to the United States, they would contribute much less to regional deterrence, which is extremely important for the United States both from a security and economic point of view”.
KCNA published an article titled ‘Present situation of US-ROK alliance on defence cost sharing negotiations’, writing that “whenever the master of the White House is replaced, the puppet ROK has to be seized with uneasiness over various issues ranging from security and economy to the cost of the U.S. forces’ presence in it as a deserted woman. This fatalistic situation clearly shows the weakness of the U.S.-ROK alliance advertising the ’supreme blood alliance’ and ’true friendly relations’”.
The ROK media emphasises a significant lack of understanding of South Korea’s current defence policy and its contribution to the alliance. Meanwhile, ‘excessive demands from the United States may also weaken the bilateral alliance, increasing anti-US sentiment among the South Korean public’.
To sum up, the parties managed to conclude an agreement on terms favourable to Seoul, but it is possible that, against the background of the impeachment of Yoon Suk Yeol, US pressure in this sphere will increase. The question is: to what extent will the new leadership of the Republic of Korea be able to ensure its strategic autonomy?
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