Chethana Janith, Jadetimes Staff
C. Janith is a Jadetimes news reporter and sub-editor covering science and geopolitics.
Beijing’s rush to embrace renewable energy - and Moscow’s reluctance - poses a systemic threat to economic cooperation between the two countries.
Russia’s absence was conspicuous at the recent COP28 climate summit in Dubai. This absence reflects the Kremlin’s skepticism toward the green agenda: while Russia’s new climate doctrine, published in October, acknowledges climate change, it also claims the phenomenon requires further study.
By refusing to take climate change seriously, Moscow is already incurring financial losses. The costs could escalate in the medium term, potentially disrupting trade with China, which has adopted a radically different approach.
Although China is the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter, it has also become the leading producer of green technologies and is actively reducing its hydrocarbon imports. While Russia downplays the importance of combating climate change - fearing a threat to its fossil fuel exports, the backbone of its economy - China has developed one of the world’s largest low-carbon industrial sectors.
The contrast between the two nations is stark. For instance, in a recent interview with China Media Group, Russian President Vladimir Putin appeared visibly irritated when asked about the future of humanity in the context of renewable energy cooperation. He dismissed climate change as secondary to issues like poverty, highlighting the divergent priorities of Moscow and Beijing.
In contrast, climate policy has emerged as a rare bright spot in Sino-American relations. While it may not dominate headlines like trade wars or espionage, it underscores ongoing efforts to build a positive agenda.
However, Moscow is unlikely to elevate its climate cooperation with Beijing to the level of Sino-American collaboration. This is not due to a lack of potential but rather a deliberate political choice by the Kremlin.
Unlike Moscow, Beijing has successfully integrated renewables into its economic framework. China’s evolving energy infrastructure means it will increasingly rely less on Russian supplies.
Over the past decade, China has transitioned from an outlier to a global leader in climate change technology. In June, non-fossil fuel energy sources surpassed 50 percent of China’s total electricity generation capacity for the first time. While only about 25 percent of China’s electricity currently comes from renewables, with coal accounting for 56 percent, the utilization rate is steadily increasing. The solar, wind, hydro, and nuclear capacity added by China in 2023 alone is projected to generate 424 terawatt hours annually - equivalent to France’s total electricity consumption.
Beyond economic achievements, addressing climate change has become central to Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s political vision, encapsulated in the concept of an “ecological civilization.” Chinese state propaganda frequently highlights the successes of the green economy.
This progress poses a direct challenge to Russian fossil fuel exports. In the coming decades, China’s energy consumption patterns could shift so dramatically that its demand for Russian hydrocarbons diminishes significantly. The accelerated adoption of electric vehicles in China, driven by government subsidies, has already led to forecasts by Chinese oil company Sinopec that gasoline consumption will peak this year. Chinese oil demand is expected to plateau by the decade’s end before entering a decline.
While developing renewable energy, which is becoming increasingly affordable, China is also working to maximize domestic hydrocarbon extraction. By 2030, this dual approach could allow China to reduce fossil fuel imports by up to 10 percent.
Together, these efforts make China progressively less reliant on external sources, including Russia. For Beijing, renewable energy is not merely a strategy to combat climate change - it is also a pathway to energy independence. Solar, wind, and hydropower resources are abundant within the country, unaffected by international price volatility or supply constraints. When renewable sources falter, China’s coal-fired power stations, largely fueled by domestic coal, provide a reliable backup.
The energy relationship between Russia and China, however, remains secure for at least the next five years. China continues to be the world’s largest consumer of hydrocarbons, with Russia as its primary supplier. Chinese natural gas consumption is projected to increase until 2035. Nevertheless, the slowing pace of coal, oil, and gas consumption in China will inevitably heighten competition among suppliers.
Warning signs have already emerged. Beijing’s tough stance during negotiations over the Power of Siberia 2 natural gas pipeline highlights its shift toward greener priorities. Initially intended to deliver Russian gas to China’s northern regions - leaders in renewable energy - the pipeline project remains unresolved. Despite expectations for a breakthrough during Putin’s visit to China in October, no agreement was reached.
Compounding Russia’s challenges, other countries are vying to supply China with natural gas. Central Asian nations are advancing their pipeline projects, while Southeast Asian states are boosting seaborne gas exports. With its substantial investment in renewables, China now has the flexibility to select its energy partners. In contrast, Russia, heavily reliant on fossil fuels, has far fewer options.
Political considerations also play a role. Russia’s land-based hydrocarbon deliveries to China are immune to disruptions by the U.S. Navy, making them a strategic asset. In the event of heightened tensions between Beijing and Washington, Moscow’s close alignment with Beijing ensures that Russian fossil fuels will remain part of China’s energy mix for the foreseeable future.
Still, if Sino-American relations remain stable, economic factors will ultimately guide Beijing’s energy decisions. By prioritizing fossil fuel exports and sidelining the climate agenda, Moscow may inadvertently undermine its own strategic goals.
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